Segregations and Geopolitical “New” Orders: Turkish Armed Forces as Entrepreneurial Venturist Masters

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ABSTRACT

Beginning with the epistemological principle, International Relations (IR) critiques “world politics”, we look at the discipline of International Political Economy (IPE) within IR, considering to what extent IPE re-thinks key IR divides. What does IPE mean when the military-industrial complex is a site of power for the accumulation of resources and knowledge production? Can we critically theorize without understanding the international, the military, or the industrial as contested categories? How have critical theories of security and militarization and their racial formations been “globally” and “locally” positioned? Does an assumed segregation of security and property relations preclude making tensions visible in security regimes and among vulture capitalists? This essay foregrounds Turkey and its armed forces as sites of critical inquiry into the key divides of IR: national and international; global and local; the economy and state relations; rationality and bodies. We highlight what is produced as viable within the fields of the current model of global power and collective practices instrumental in changing IPE consensus about global processes and relations to dissent.

Keywords: Geopolitics and Segregation, Collective Capitalist, Turkish Armed Forces, IPE and the Military, OYAK.

Segregasyonlar ve Jeopolitik “Yeni” Düzenler: Müteşebbis Efendiler olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri

ÖZET


Anahtar Kelimeler: Jeopolitik ve Ayrışma, Kolektif Kapitalist, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, UEP ve Ordu, OYAK.

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Introduction

Global shifts in power, including the post-Soviet vacuum, have led to a resurgence of regionalism. Like other states, Turkey has been embroiled in trade wars, border disputes, and disagreements over the management of its institutions and resources. Turkish groups, military and otherwise, accuse each other of “competing conceptions of national interest,” attempting to reorient themselves in a shifting global environment. To cite one example, the relocation of Eurasia from the periphery to the centre of the US zone of strategic interest in the 1990s deepened the region’s fault lines, generating space for new projects and roles. Within this rapidly evolving global environment, military, state, and civil society actors draw on norms such as “self-determination as democratic entitlement” to emerge as leaders. Liberal actors in Turkish society recognize that new practices — actively participating in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, revitalizing and/or reconfiguring alliances with countries like Iran, and assuming leadership roles in the shaping of Eurasia’s internal dynamics — disrupt familiar, naturalized, political presumptions and methods, separating economies from politics, national from international, sovereign states from regions, and civil actors from subjects.

In this article, we articulate a radicalized-genealogical ontology that contributes to the excavation of “unfinished” projects, revolutions, and alternative methods of assembling power, including the “interest for the continued democratization of social existence.” We consider some dominant frameworks (i.e., global) in International Political Economy (IPE) and conjunct them with “local” analyses of the Turkish armed forces to show how such analytical segregations of the military and its embeddedness in a new world order make it difficult to recognize state socio-economic and political shifts in regional integration, capital formations, foreign policy, state and market restructurings. We foreground the “peripheral” state of Turkey and its military relations as sites of critical inquiry and collective practice to argue that these sites provide an understanding of the shifts and contestations of global power and reformulations of the segregations in the practice and knowledge production of IPE.

When engaging with the site of the military, we find segregation on three intertwined registers: (1) the segregation of the military from other civil institutions in Turkey and elsewhere; (2) the segregation of the national from the international, as if Turkish military institutional formation were independent from other sovereign institutions; and finally, (3) the formation and constitution of national sovereignty as independent from “international” political economy, or the “global political economy.”

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4 We owe this insight to one of our anonymous reviewers.
Yet tensions and segregations emanate from the rift in the current order as Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu puts it,5 and from the military’s embeddedness in a form of global power whose central goal is not the socialization of power. Further, despite these segregations, the Turkish military is a crucial actor in the securitization of the state, a “collective capitalist”6 who works to hierarchialize market relations.7 It has recast institutional frameworks to generate wealth for the upper and middle “public” classes, its major clients and has restructured itself, becoming integrated into global capital, notably through OYAK (Military Personnel Assistance and Pension Fund).

Today the Turkish military is at a crossroads. It supports the vision and interests of “big” capital in Turkey and the EU through its pro-Western secularist position which could enable EU integration; yet internal groups organized around various social and institutional projects have issued a challenge, exposing the myth of a unified modernizing guardian of the republic. An example of this institutional strife, the recent Ergenekon trial resulted in the purging of the dissident Eurasian faction; the faction had demanded a reorientation in strategy in building alliances with Russia and emerging powers like China and Iran.8

The military’s pro-Western yet nationalist and sovereignty-focused discourse is situated in a context of “internationalization” of capital and points to the tension between OYAK’s aspirations to incorporate itself into European and global capital and its reluctance to relinquish its legal and political privileges in the face of increasing pressure from Europe to comply with the EU competition law. While these shifts point to constitutions of global power in world politics, they also indicate epistemological and pedagogical sets of events and (in) tensions significant for IR as an academic discipline, a source of knowledge production, and a field of practical politics.

Below, we draw out understandings of segregation by considering contending ontologies in studies of the social relations of the Turkish Armed Forces, noting the violence9 produced by and contained within our own epistemological frameworks and our methods of making claims. Critiquing the literatures that analyze the formation of the Turkish Armed Forces, and problematizing IPE scholars’ major presumptions of segregation in the imaginaries and empiricism of state and military, and state and market, we articulate radicalized historico-geneological ontology produced within historically

9 We say “violence,” as we are interested in a longer historical trajectory of the global than the constitution of the interstate structure which focuses on state security/absence of war.
embedded material and social relations. A critical IR theoretical framework that emerges from our analyses of the Turkish Armed Forces indicates ruptures of segregation in doing and imaginaries, politico-ontologies and methodologies, national and regional politics.

Segregation and Geopolitics

International Political Economy addresses a set of related problems that engage with the formation of social power, including the intertwining of politics and economics. IPE has concentrated on understanding world politics around questions of trade, finance, North-South relations, multinational corporations, and the emergence and reassembling of homogenizing global power. As a field of inquiry, IPE broadened in the 1970s when theorists asked what the object of inquiry(s) should be as a field. Should IPE involve itself with sovereign states whose major goal is competition for wealth and power, or focus on “exceptions” such as cooperation and order? Others wondered whether IPE should consider the organization of production and exchange on a world scale or the global relationship between politics and economics. The current international political and intellectual “crisis” has led IPE scholars to articulate imaginaries and point to interventions in world politics.

Neorealism: Order or Coloniality?

Historically, when market relations penetrate a society, a dynamic is introduced which enables the separation of politics and economics. In long-standing industrialized capitalist economies, this separation took place more than four centuries ago. Theorists argue that the separation of these spheres is “natural” and hierarchical: the political addresses power and social relations, and the economic concerns itself with the production and circulation of goods as well as wealth. But the central question of compatibility between a political order governed by the pursuit of power and an economic order moved by the endless pursuit of wealth is omnipresent. In fact, politics and economics are de facto interdependent. The monetary rules decreed by those governing must not frustrate the circulation of private credit, which feeds the circulation of goods. Intervention by political authorities can lead to a loss of value for the local currency, thus moving trade and productive activity away from their territory. So a second dependency of the political on the economic is that if economic conditions are unfavorable, it will be difficult for the political authority to raise the taxes it needs for its continued existence.


This assumed hierarchical separation has been challenged as a result of the shifting global political economy, including the continuation of coloniality of power, production relations on a world-scale (structural adjustment programs, nationalist development projects). Global changes such as decline in labor sources due to war put pressure on knowledge production and reveal the limitations of the dominant theoretical orientations, neorealist, world-systems, and (neo)liberal theories as modes of understanding the problems faced by societies.

Neorealism, the dominant school of thought in mainstream IPE inquiry, has concerned itself with explaining the emergence of the political order among competing states, an order that makes possible regularized international economic relations. This approach presumes “anarchy” in world politics where states are “pre-constituted individuals, struggling for security in a lawless and amoral world”\(^\text{14}\) and use the military instrumentally to achieve national security. Neorealists believe that “individuals” compete over relative resources in order to accumulate power and wealth which can be used to influence decisions. Their major problem is to explain cooperation in this anarchic and competitive world. Gilpin asks: “How does one explain the existence of an interdependent international economy?”\(^\text{15}\)

Despite such critiques of neorealism, theorists like Gilpin insist on a definite separation, a hierarchy of civil society and the state, and the “long-run harmony between wealth and power as means-ends of national policy.”\(^\text{16}\) In 1987, Gilpin articulated a “standard definition” of International Political Economy\(^\text{17}\) to argue the interdependence of state and market:

> The parallel existence and mutual interaction of “state” and “market” in the modern world create “political economy.” In the absence of the state, the price mechanism and market forces would determine the outcome of economic activities; this would be the pure world of the economist. In the absence of the market, the state or its equivalent would allocate economic resources: this would be the pure world of the political scientist.\(^\text{18}\)

While challenging the dichotomous relationship of civil society and state, this definition perpetuates the division of civil society and the military and does not explain the chronic conflicts and transformations which preclude their harmonization.

Neorealists insist on a commitment to abstract individualism and the mercantilist conception of the state which divides the world into spatialities, and temporalities that can be managed with their own functional logics. However, this supports a static view of the state and the individual. This group of theorists evades theorizing the social bases of


power, the historically constituted ideas and practices which sustain specific formations of states. Furthermore, as Rupert argues, they place changes “outside the scope of inquiry,” limiting us from considering urgent contemporary issues.

This segregation has been challenged by world system, Marxist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial theorists and by the shifts in world politics (with the emergence of the US as the major political leader, capital could consolidate and obtain neoliberal predominance). Yet neorealist “global” and “local” approaches to IPE still presume state-functional assumptions which depend on a hierarchical division between civil society and the state, civil society and the military, drawing on these assumptions to discuss challenges to neo-realism or explain the shifting social bases of state power in Turkey. Seen as an extension of state power, the Turkish military has been exempt from systematic analysis.

These neorealist assumptions in IPE or the “family of arguments related by a common set of fundamental, if often, unspoken, commitments” dominated by the “presumption of anarchy in world politics” underline many arguments, especially those dealing with the power, the role, and the practices of the Turkish Armed Forces. Their state-centrism cases such theorists to assign autonomy to the state; they also argue that a fundamental boundary separates civilian and military institutions. This can be further broken down into a military sphere set against societal, economic, and cultural spheres. When critiqued, they argue that while the military has acquired significant power over Turkey’s national security and accumulation regimes, it has abided by civilian and liberal norms except in “exceptional” moments when it was forced to suppress the disruption of the secular and unitary republican state. Ultimately, they confirm the primacy of the atomistic sovereign universe despite practices that disrupt this assumption. They do not account for the context or the material-life of multiple-normative contents within which the emergence and consolidation of such relations are possible.

How is this normative value about the primacy of the state arranged or organized? What modes of thinking are required to achieve a consistent account of the legitimacy of the state’s use and/or threat of force to sustain its power? Is it merely neorealists who enable this kind of primacy?

Is Liberalism/(Neo) Liberalism or the Economy Stupid?

Critical approaches to neorealist IPE emerging in the 1980s and 1990s took a more nuanced look at the domestic social and political arrangements affecting the relations and policy roles of the state and military spheres. Scholarship in journals such as Toplum

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19 Rupert, Production of Global Power, p.6.
20 Ibid., p.3.
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ve Bilim,24 and journalist publishing in daily newspapers like Radikal, Sabah and Zaman presume the segregation of the public and private powers and focus on the analysis of “civil society.” This work presumes the dichotomies of state/society, state/ individual, East/ West, nationalist/globalist, as naturalized categories with no apparent need to unpack their significance. Key concepts include globalization, identity, civil society, democracy, and liberalism.25 They identify a serious crisis of state-centrism in post-1980 Turkey,26 noting the effects of globalization and the crises of the 1990s and 2001.27

Keyman and Öniş argue that the state has not responded to sweeping (globalizing) social, economic, and cultural changes.28 They presume the “state” or “Turkish politics” to be static agents who are not responding to the demands of civil society for greater democratization, participation, and recognition. They assign specific roles to civil society and the state, attributing a higher moral valence to civil society’s demands, arguing that a “failure” to respond to these claims has led to conflict between civil society29 and the state and the military/security establishment. Öniş30 acknowledges the political and economic role of the military but does not theorize the changes; he simply presumes the armed forces to be the political establishment/state elite. In his analyses of EU-Turkish relations, he welcomes the diminishing power of the military as part of the anti-EU, anti-globalization coalition,31 calling it an achievement of democratization.32

In the daily newspaper Təraf (2007–2010), liberal critics criticize the republican state and the armed forces. Ahmet Altan, the editor-in-chief and leading columnist, employs a theoretical framework similar to that used by Keyman and Öniş and other

25 Ibid.

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liberal and/or left theorists and public intellectuals, and offers an analysis of the Turkish state in the new global era based on a dichotomy of the state and (civil) society: in “the age of industry, the nation-state, the working class, the ‘dual’ structure in the economy, borders, customs, flags, militaries, and peasantry have been replaced by new classes and new values.”33 The EU’s borderless world, with one currency, law, and constitution, represents the “new” way of life, while regions like the Middle East represent the “old.”34 According to Altan, the Turkish state and regime have refused to adjust to the new rules/norms. In this “covert military dictatorship,” the economy, politics, and religion are subject to and controlled by the state.35 The power is in the hands of a state elite composed of the “soldier, judge, and the bureaucrat,”36 the greatest obstacle to democratization and development (Europeanization). Altan lauds the recent steps by the AKP government to limit the military’s influence, as well as the Ergenekon trial, as proof that the political process and its contingent powers are being transferred to the “people.”37

While such thinkers38 see the political/military and civil spheres as separate, with the latter a space of freedoms and the former able to exert power anytime and anywhere, they have problematized the realist/neorealist debates of IPE by assuming a dynamic relationship between the state and the Turkish Armed Forces and noting the shifts of the civilian and military sub-systems and their heterogeneity. Their well-articulated contention, that the location of the boundary between these two spheres is not as fixed and unchangeable as the neorealists would have it, has shifted the debate. They also suggest that because the boundary is malleable, it is possible to move Turkey into the fast-changing regional and global context.

This theoretical approach heralds the new relationships between civilian actors and security forces. The analyses have led to the recognition that the armed forces have intervened in certain civilian spheres and influenced the shifts of some social formations more than others. They bring to the fore coalitions of officers, politicians, and market actors, making it clear that the military has shaped the discourse of Turkey’s political elites and citizens on a variety of issues, including the Cypriot, Kurdish, and Armenian questions.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
Critical Approaches

In the 1990s, IR and IPE theorists addressed the primacy of the state and the economy by introducing aspects of radicalized politico-ontologies. Poststructural theorists problematized the essentialism embodied in analyses of dominant approaches, as well as claims to a universal understanding of class, the market, the revolutionary subject, and relations; Marxist analysts divided themselves into Gramscians and “open Marxists” presuming once more that theory and practice are segregated. For the latter, the necessities of capital alone cannot explain the configuration and trajectory of this perspective of knowledge that argues for the agency of the West.

Postcolonial theorizations about the ordering of the interstate structure make visible a segregation that draws on the codification of relations between Europeans and non-Europeans. This Cartesian binary and dualist perspective on knowledge is particular to Eurocentrism and was constituted (through military and other colonial means such as slavery and colonization) as globally hegemonic by the expansion of European colonial dominance. Critiques of Eurocentric and Occidental understandings of the postwar order, its institutions, and political processes allow us to view the “present” anew. Grovogui articulates political possibilities “beyond” anarchy outside Western political formations. As Muppidi argues, following Fanon, such colonial globalities “rely on coercive power – the capacity to inflict violence and control the conditions of living – to be effective,” and thus, “it is often only counter-violence that opens up a space for the acknowledgment of difference.”

The acknowledgment of and political commitment to understanding difference continues to be an area of contention within IR and IPE and the main vehicle of geopolitical segregation, including what is understood as “critical international political economy.” Understanding difference may not be the central question, but the tension around asks what the global hegemonic model of power presupposes about colonization. To answer, we must consider the intertwinement of power, capital, and Eurocentrism in the formation of the military in general and the Turkish military specifically.

40 Andreas Bieler, Werner Bonefeld, Peter Burnham, and Adam David Morton, Global Restructuring, State, Capital and Labour, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
41 G. Chowdhry and S. Nair (Eds.), Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class, New York, Routledge, 2002.
42 Agathangelou, “Bodies of Desire”,
International political economists gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s with the transformation of world politics. To their analyses, they bring a Foucauldian perspective and the poststructural theory of the resurgence of Marxism in the form of a neo-Gramscian/transnational class alliance approach. It is not enough to focus on state and private actors; one must also consider labor relations, family emergence and dynamics, the formation of global order, transnational hegemonies, and the formation of subjects. These postcolonial, feminist, and radical theorists of imperialism advocate for institutions and economies that will not be “brutal” to the majority of the world. The work departs from earlier attempts at internationalizing the “other” that draws on the political economy of international structures and ongoing colonial dependencies to explain that such an understanding of subjectivity evades the hegemonic model of global power within which the “other” becomes constituted as naturally inferior.

By noting the limitations in the earlier international model of accumulation, Calinicos draws our attention to the segregation of accumulation and power. He notes that the US is the leading military power in the (re)ordering of global power, citing Eisenhower on the military-industrial complex and Wolin on the changes in the global industrial complex to highlight the new social relations of power or “inverted totalitarianism” which abdicates “governmental responsibility for the well-being of the citizenry”:

The privatization of public services and functions manifests the steady evolution of corporate power into a political form, into an integral, even dominant partner with the state. It marks the transformation of American politics and its political culture, from a system in which democratic practices and values were, if not defining, at least major contributory elements, to one where the remaining democratic elements of the state and its populist programs are being systematically dismantled.⁴⁶

Chalmers questions the analytic framework of dividing the world (what Trouillot calls the planetary⁴⁷) into political and economic spheres, by focusing on sources of accumulation or regimes of politics as separate from each other. He questions the split between domestic and non-domestic power but does not consider how in certain contexts, the military becomes a crucial site of contestation of a capitalist and imperial power; nor does he examine the role such institutions play in constituting global⁴⁸ power through capital.⁴⁹

Going further, Rupert and Lutz⁵⁰ problematize the division of the economy and politics as well as the segregation of domestic from international (and masculine from feminine). They argue that studies separating “culture” from political economy⁵¹ avoid the

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ways “global” power and order are consolidated by the US and others; each draws on a
different method of consolidation based on its historical formation. These theorists argue
that neorealist and liberal approaches limit our understanding of the historically specific
organization of social relations, including production and possibilities for change, as their
ontological primacies presume evolutionary and dualistic logics.

Yet these critical frameworks preclude an analysis of the configuration of the
hegemonic global model of power whose ontological primacy of the naturalized superior
race began with the colonization of America. If we begin with this trajectory as our point
of departure from other critical IPE theorists and acknowledge those who re-situate the
crucial questions of critical IPE in coloniality, we can argue that the model of power that
is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality with race as a politico-
onological structuring project. Any critical theorizing of the international political
economy of the armed forces must begin with this insight.

Starting with this insight, we could analyze the military institution’s attempts to
articulate the segregation of the global world system in a radically different way which
highlights a model of power which constitutes itself as global by bringing together all
spheres of social existence under the hegemony of an institution produced within the
process of formation and development of that same model of power. Different institutions
control different spheres. For instance, the capitalist enterprise controls labor and its
resource, the bourgeois family controls sex, its resources and products, the nation-state
controls and manages authority, resources and its products, and Eurocentrism controls
and manages intersubjectivity. Each and everyone of these institutions exist in a relation
of interdependence, albeit ridden with many tensions.

Once we articulate this framework, the nuances of the historical formation of the
Turkish Armed Forces and its shifts within the changing dynamics “inside” and “outside”
Turkey and the “cracks” in the hegemony of this global model of power become visible.

Rather than merely problematizing the territorial segregation of the world and the
context (domestic and international), together with the historical development of systemic
relations (the formation of interstate structure), this analytic points to the relevance of
the global politico-ontologic structuring that presumes coloniality of power and draws
on Eurocentrism and capital to constitute itself anew. The military as an institution
of this power is in control of labor and its resources. Hence, its derivation of capitalist
entrepreneurial modes: to control sex and its resources, it controls the bourgeois family; to
control authority and its resources and products, it controls aspects of the nation-state; to
control intersubjectivity, it controls expressions of Eurocentrism.

What kind of social relations have facilitated the separation of politics and
economics, or civil society and the military? What constellation of public and private
powers has made Turkey a major regional and global actor? What shifts have been taking

place in the Turkish Armed Forces? What discursive, political, economic, and social frameworks have made possible a vibrant liberal/neo-liberal market-state-society in Turkey?

To answer these questions, we must articulate “globality” as it informs our reading of IR and IPE understandings of force and economic relations and the armed forces in Turkey. Globality begins with social existence as historico-onto-structurally heterogeneous and with intersubjective-being as primary to any other relation (even work relations) and with the tensions generated in the constitution of the hegemonic model of power whose primary assumption is property relations (modernity).54 While there is a trajectory toward “a common value orientation” including a set of “common” social practices and hegemonic institutions in all aspects of social existence, this trajectory is always contested – even when hegemonic institutions of social existence are universal but not necessarily global.55

The first major movement with a nationalist/anti-imperialist and developmentalist program started with the Yon Declaration (1961). Setting the tone for subsequent critical and revolutionary movements, it argues that Turkish society requires a new direction under new state cadres with a developmentalist philosophy56. Economic problems and underdevelopment it says are a consequence of the failure of the Kemalist cadres who distanced themselves from the people, becoming an increasingly bureaucratic clique.57 In its critique of the contemporary Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) which offered a class-based analysis and a political program for social transformation,58 it says “development” will be achieved via “nationalist,” “statist,” and “populist” discourses/programs led by “enlightened” and “progressive” cadres. A legacy of the Yön movement is the understanding that the state is a social agent above or autonomous from classes59 and development can be achieved under the auspices of a state led by the “right” cadres, including the “progressive” wing of the military.60


55 Agathangelou, “Bodies of Desire”, p.5

56 By a developmentalist philosophy or strategy, following Ercan and Oguz (2007), (this source is in the bibliography below) we refer to strategies emphasizing national competitiveness and protectionism along with a theorization of the state as an ally of labor or the oppressed masses against imperialism and more recently, neoliberal globalization.


59 Ercan, “Sınıftan Kaçış”, p. 640; Doğan Avcıoğlu as the leading theorist of the movement see Türkiye’nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın, Yenişehir, Ankara, Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968.

The 1980s and 1990s were rife with (re)assemblages of social relations and practices. States and social actors found new circuits of capital and new power dynamics. Turkish capital made interventions to “integrate” into global accumulation regimes, orienting itself toward business and projects that would allow it to consolidate itself as a financial accumulator in the region but also centralize itself as a major actor in the larger global structures. The military both as structuring politico-ontologic site, a “social relation and institutional ensemble”61 participated in that process intimately. Sustaining its supremacist socio-ontologic role it attempted to contain the antagonisms generated due to the restructurings and also to pursue an orientation that would lead it to emerge centrally as a financial accumulator and as a cutting-edge profit maker, albeit with many tensions with different wings of political and capital leadership. While the analytical distinctions of neorealists and liberals between “domestic” and “global” reassemblages of social relations disrupt these fragmented fields of political action, they open up spaces for critiques and transformative practices. With increasing contradictions and struggles between and within classes, genders, and racial groups in Turkey, anti-imperialist and developmentalist analyses came to the fore at the expense of class-centered analyses focusing on the long-term dynamics of capital accumulation and class relations therein. These analyses echo back to those of the 1960s and 1970s: one strand focuses on imperialism, employing an anti-imperialist discourse; another considers developmentalism.

Arguably, the two leading representatives of the first are the Workers’ Party (IP)62 and the National Party (Ulusal Parti) and its publication, Turkish Left (Türksolu). They are united by their anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist acceptance of Kemalism and nationalism (outright racism in the case of the National Party and Türksolu, particularly in discussions of Kurds and Armenians).63 While they locate themselves on the left of the political spectrum and present themselves as an alternative to the so-called “comprador left,” their analysis of imperialism (particularly NATO and EU) and its relationship with Turkey is devoid of a study of class relations as mediated by other axes of power, including gender, race, and sexuality. Nor do they examine tensions in the social bases of power and wealth; their political strategy is based on a national (and developmentalist) opposition to foreign domination. Interestingly, they assign a progressive role to the military, considering it a potentially transformative social agent.64

Leaving aside the “left” nationalists as an extreme reaction to recent developments both in and outside Turkey, developmentalists, particularly the Independent Social Scientists (BSB),65 are critics of neoliberal “globalization.” Yeldan, a leading member, takes an eclectic

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61 Akca, “Kollektif Bir Sermayedar”, p.23.
62 The leader, Perinçek was arrested during the Ergenekon prosecution.
63 Their writing presents the Kurd as “the” problem/question and calls for a forced migration of Kurds in western Turkey to their hometowns in eastern Turkey; a recent title is “Why is the Kurd a fascist?” See http://www.turksolu.org/arsiv.htm (Accessed on 25 November 2010).
64 This shows the ongoing influence of the Yön Movement and Dogan Avcıoğlu, who advocated a national democratic revolution by a broad front led by Kemalist intellectuals and young Kemalist lieutenants in Devarım (Revolution), the journal he published until the 1971 military memorandum.
65 The group was set up to “enlighten the society against the neoliberal policies that have led to the collapse of the Turkish economy and the dissolution of the social fabric (bonds).” http://www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org/bsbkurucu.html (Accessed on 10 September 2010).
His comprehensive critique of liberal analyses of globalization with their ideological discourse is both subjective and voluntarist. To him, the current phase of internationalization is a continuation of the expansion of capitalist relations over the past two centuries. Development is “an interim accumulation regime that resulted from the stumbling of the process of capitalist expansion that began in the 19th century as well as from the unique circumstances of a world characterized by the appearance of a socialist bloc and the birth of new nation-states.” Although he condemns stripping the state of its productive, investor characteristic/role, he advocates the revival of the developmental state which could carry out its developmental role under the rule of the working class.

Within development and modernization practices and discourses, the military has an instrumental and substantive role. As the first institution to modernize itself under the Ottoman Empire (to sustain its power), it legitimized itself in the global reassemblage of imperial powers as a modernizer that founded a secular nation-state from a dwindling Empire. After its 1946 transition to multi-party politics, the military was able to posit its legitimacy even when it used direct violent interventions (such as coups) to thwart internal threats to the secular, unitary, and republican character of the state. Once the military achieved its political, economic, and social goals, it “went back to its barracks.” Since the 1980s, the Turkish Armed Forces has had the institutional mechanisms necessary to perform its desired role without resorting to direct interventions. Now, the military’s intervention in Turkish society includes both political practice and an increasingly significant involvement in processes of accumulation through its economic wing, OYAK. The direct participation of the armed forces in social relations on all registers in the past half-century has disrupted the military’s claims to being the guardian of the nation’s interests, not to mention dominant theorizations on this institution.

OYAK was incorporated as a private entity during the transition to an import-substitution accumulation strategy and the rise of leftist developmentalist thought. Its original and ostensible goal was to provide members with “supplementary retirement benefits” apart from the official retirement fund. In addition to “disability benefits” and

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67 Ibid., p.429.
70 Ibid. p. 450. Fuat Erkan critiques the developmentalist approach, see “Sınıftan Kaçış”.
74 OYAK was incorporated as a private entity under its own law (3 January 1961) subject to Turkish civic and commercial codes.
“death benefits,” OYAK provides members with social services such as loans, home loans, and retirement income systems. What makes OYAK noteworthy, however, is its assumption of the role of a “collective capitalist.” In fact, OYAK’s most distinctive characteristic is its participation in profit-driven activities in all spheres of capital accumulation in Turkey and abroad.

The broader social processes and regimes of accumulation in the past 50 years have shaped OYAK’s investment strategies. At the same time, while it is difficult to pinpoint a direct connection, the armed forces have played a crucial role in the transition to and institutionalization of regimes of accumulation. Its political interventions have been articulated (and confirmed) as “resolving” general social crises which cannot be separated from the crises of capital accumulation, including repurposing Turkey’s role and power in a capitalist political order to protect the interests of its bourgeoisie. In fact, the military’s interventions in 1960 and 1980 mark the beginning of two phases of capitalist accumulation.

The 1960 coup was critical in the transition from an accumulation strategy based on merchant capital to one based on industrial capital and its protection at the national level. Although it cannot be claimed that the coup directly supported industrial capital, the subsequent social environment facilitated its development. As the domestic market gained in importance, and private capital moved to industry, the state focused on the production of goods for the private sector. The dominant expectation by industrial capital was that OYAK funds could be channeled into their own investments, but OYAK became one of the largest holding companies in the country.

An inward-looking form of capital accumulation and the accompanying strategy of import-substitution characterized the 1960-1980 period. OYAK’s investments were concentrated in sectors targeting a five-year development plan, protected from foreign competition, and generating high profits. The early 1970s witnessed a sharp increase in OYAK’s investments in the automotive and cement sectors, along with food, insurance, and pesticide. Thanks largely to its strategic partnership with French automotive giant Renault, OYAK dominated the automotive sector in Turkey.

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78 Ibid., p. 238.
79 According to TESEV, at year-end 2009, OYAK’s total assets were TL 12.676 million; the combined sales revenue of all OYAK companies reached TL 19.1 billion; http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-218447-turkish-military-nurtures-an-economic-leviathan.html (Accessed on 3 September, 2010).
81 Haldun Gülalp, 1983, quoted in Ercan and Tuna, “İç Burjuvazinin Gelişimi.”
83 Ibid. p. 244.
After a crisis in the 1970s, the accumulation strategy was the 1980 military takeover and a subsequent reconfiguration of social relations and power. Effectively eliminating social opposition (from the working class), the military, backed by the US, took a new route to accumulation and institutionalized the rules of the new capital practices. OYAK took the opportunity to diversify its investments, focusing on rising sectors such as finance, making it one of the most profitable and powerful capital groups in Turkey.

The most significant change has been OYAK’s adoption of a new discourse and approach. OYAK has distanced itself from nationalist/developmentalist discourses and strategies of the pre-1980 era. The shift in ideational and material orientation found concrete expression in the sale of Oyakbank for $2.7 billion in 2007 to the Dutch ING Group, eliciting criticism from protectionist and nationalist circles. OYAK’s CEO, Coskun Ulusoy, countered by presenting the sale as a normal consequence of the recent “relocation and development of the group’s activities, as well as opening them to global markets,” thus indicating OYAK’s new configuration and globalist orientation.

The Marxian Critique

In analyses of the state and the military in Turkey, recent literature with a Marxist, class perspective attempts to go beyond national-developmentalist and liberal-leftist approaches that focus on the state–civil society dichotomy. Instead of this dichotomy (or state/individual, West/East, public/private), it emphasizes the class relations underpinning state and civil society. Scholars criticize national-developmentalist strategies for making politically misleading distinctions between financial and productive capital, or between national and foreign institutions. They also criticize liberal-leftist positions for their unrealistic view of the US and the EU as separate entities with different projects of globalization. They argue that both strategies shift the focus away from class dynamics, and suggest that anti-neoliberal strategies should focus on the basic contradiction between labor and capital, rather than on the misleading dichotomies between financial and productive capital, national and foreign institutions, US and EU, or state and civil society.

In critiquing the rigid dichotomies of the state and society, the economic from the political and the local/national from the global/international, they highlight the embeddedness of the state in social relations.

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84 The “foreign currency” crisis of the late 1970s actually marked the limits of an accumulation strategy centered on the domestic market and the production of consumption goods (for a comprehensive analysis, see Erkan and Ozturk, “1979 Krizinden 2001 Krizine”).
86 OYAK has welcomed financial integration and the entrance of foreign financial companies into the Turkish financial market; yet Ulusoy, in his speech praising financial integration, advised against selling companies like TUPRAS, TELEKOM, and ERDEMIR, arguing that “these companies are unique and strategically too important to be handed over to the foreigners” (ibid.). Interestingly, OYAK recently (2005) purchased 49.29 % of ERDEMIR.
Dinler, in her critique of the state-society dichotomy in Turkish historiography, and Oğuz, in her dissertation on the restructuring of the Turkish state in the neoliberal period, theorize the state as the crystallization of class relations and a space for class struggle, not a space autonomous from other spheres of social life and practice. Ercan and Oğuz, through a study of public procurement law and anti-neoliberal strategies in Turkey, showed the limits of the autonomy of the political or the state by considering the relationship between the dynamics of capital accumulation and the state. Yalman, taking a neo-Gramscian perspective, attacks the liberal separation of the state and civil society/economy; this oppositional (counter-)hegemonic discourse portrayed the market and civil society as independent spheres characterized as freedoms, with the state a static entity incapable of adjusting to domestic and global changes. For Yalman, this has disconnected neoliberal policies and restructuring from a broader democratization discourse.

While this relatively recent Marxist IPE literature presents a powerful critique of the theory of the state employed by mainstream critical approaches, few scholars provide a thorough reading of the Turkish armed forces. One exception is İsmet Akça, whose work on the military as a “collective capitalist” notes the military’s dominant ontologies. Drawing on Parla’s pioneering work, Akça focuses on OYAK’s ability to set the new limits to the military’s relative autonomy. For Parla, “OYAK is both a national and trans-national, legal institution, which brings together organically the higher civilian bureaucracy with the leading organizations of the business world, and which is managed by the common capital of both the state and private sector.” OYAK is a critical unit/object of analysis since it has shaped Turkish “military mercantilism.” Akça prefers the term “collective capitalist” because OYAK, an organic part of the military institution (despite claims by CEO Coşkun Ulusoy) has conducted its investments not according to a military rationale but to the dominant capital accumulation strategies of the day.

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94 “Oyak defends contradictory stance.”
95 Akça does not dismiss the fact that OYAK, in its investments, takes advantage of its privileges as a military institution. Otherwise, its actions are not guided by military rationale. Akça, “Kollektif Bir Sermayedar”.
The emergence of OYAK as the economic wing of the military and its activities in Turkish and global markets have, for Akça, created a need to rethink our understanding of the nature and evolution/transformation of the armed forces in the post-1960 period. Thanks to OYAK’s pension benefits, cheap housing credits and loans, military personnel, especially officers, adopt lifestyles of those in the middle to upper-middle income brackets; this marks the embourgeoisification of the higher ranks of the military and their insulation from the ebbs and flows of the global and domestic economy. Because of its involvement in OYAK, the Turkish Armed Forces have integrated deeper into socio-economic power relations, thereby “debunk[ing] its claims to be ‘non-partisan and non-aligned in terms of class and politics.”

The rejection of the state/military vs. civil society/economy or national vs. international/global segregation (dichotomy) is shared by other Marxist scholars. Ercan and Tuna, in their discussion of the social crisis of the late 1970s and the transition to the neoliberal order, emphasize the role of the armed forces in securing the transition and facilitating the restructuring of the Turkish state, thus disproving claims to the separation of the military from broader class relations.

Oğuz located the “internationalization of military capital” as part of the internationalization of Turkish capitalism.

With the internationalization of capital, the contradiction between the identity of the military as a collective capitalist and its image as an autonomous institution above classes and politics is deepening. The military’s ability to present itself above classes and politics becomes increasingly difficult as its interests are increasingly aligned with big internationalized capital.

So too, Bedirhanoğlu underlines the need to look at the contradictions of the neoliberal state’s restructuring in the context of the internationalization process to understand the contradictions of the recent restructuring of the armed forces.

In the last few years, the Turkish Armed Forces’ interventions in world politics have indicated a dramatic shift towards new venturist entrepreneurialism, thereby disrupting the most basic IPE ideas, raising questions about frameworks that fragment the object of knowledge and posit it as a legitimate site of constituting power. The interventions of military actors have led to the military’s institutional constitution as an entrepreneurial, venturist master capitalist; it invests in projects that make profits even when the risks endanger the subject of its protection (the members of the Turkish Armed Forces).

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97 Ibid., p.13.
100 Ercan and Tuna, “İç Burjuvazinin Gelişimi”.
101 Ercan and Tuna, “İç Burjuvazinin Gelişimi”.
103 Bedirhanoğlu, “The Restructuring of the Turkish State”.
In reading the Turkish Armed Forces through various IPE theoretical frameworks, we see shifts and re-assemblages in social relations as forces of the world’s geopolitical, economic global architecture challenge *a priori* relations between subjects and structures. The Turkish Armed Forces takes orders from the state (a traditional understanding of the relation between civil society and the military), while vying for resources to consolidate its power in an emerging global political order. Its role as a collective capitalist through OYAK and its major interventions – thwarting movements and expanding its reach by intervening in Cyprus and Northern Iraq – posit it as a major military and political force and as an entrepreneurial capitalist institution seeking new opportunities for profits.

**Conclusions, Convergences, Divergences, and Contending Ontologies**

In problematizing an important methodological question in IPE, namely the separated conceptions of state and society, international and domestic, we have focused on the political economy of the Turkish military and the Turkish Armed Forces’ articulation of segregation. By articulating how crucial the coloniality of power is in world politics, we critiqued the dominant premises of neorealism, liberal/neoliberal and critical approaches to IPE and their explanations of the sociality of the Turkish Armed Forces, and we arrived at an understanding of segregation that challenges the insignificance of spatiality and temporality which makes visible the larger political contestations about the dominant model of global power. Notably, by reconstituting its sociality in the global model of power and determining how to advance, the Turkish Armed Forces has redistributed its power.

The present analysis reaffirms that each category used in IPE to analyze the world generally, and to characterize the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkey’s political processes specifically, offers a partial and distorted reality. A useful strategy for capital, this problematic distortion is an inevitable consequence of a Eurocentric perspective, in which a linear and one-directional evolutionism is amalgamated with a dichotomous vision of history; a radical dualism separates state from civil society, national from international. The Eurocentric perspective does not know what to do with the truly “global;” like the old empiricism (which we challenge), it consistently and systematically renders invisible the global. Meanwhile, critical analyses leave intact the systematic imperial-Eurocentric approaches to understanding.

Global power’s production depends on those sites and institutions for its reconcentration – albeit rife with tensions and contradictions. But studying these tensions and how they enable shifts in global relations yields insight, enticing us to look at other aspects of the formation and constitution of global power. It is time to dismantle the Eurocentric perspective that prevails in our literature by engaging and disrupting its distorted vision of our multiple-worlds.

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104 As noted earlier, this control is partial; the armed forces enjoy relative autonomy from the political establishment and social relations.

105 Its 36,700 troops in the north of Cyprus as part of the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force nuance its position within the EU and impress political leaders who advocate the EU as a superpower.
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