The Path to an Entrenching Alliance: Utilitarianism and Historical Institutionalism in Committing to NATO’s Missile Defense System

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ABSTRACT

A critical juncture in Turkey’s NATO membership arrived in 2010 with the NATO Council’s decision, at its Lisbon summit, to build a ballistic missile defense system. After many deliberations, Turkey finally agreed to participate in NATO’s missile defense by hosting the system’s radar site in September 2011. This article investigates the main dynamics of the Turkish decision to commit to the NATO missile defense system by hosting the radar site on its territory. From a realpolitik point of view, Turkey’s participation in the missile shield presents us with a theoretical puzzle as the utilitarian calculations do not seem to indicate a positive sum gain. From a historical institutionalist perspective, the Turkish decision could be seen as a result of a path-dependent process. Assessing these alternative approaches, we bring together the strength of each school’s theoretical toolbox in order to offer a complementary explanation of Turkey’s commitment to the alliance.

Keywords: Utilitarianism, Historical Institutionalism, Alliances, NATO, Missile Defense System

Pekişen Bir İttifaka Giden Yol: NATO’nun Füze Savunma Sisteminde Katılım Bağlamında Faydacılık ve Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık

ÖZET


Anahtar Kelimeler: Faydacılık, Tarihsel Kurumsalcılık, İttifaklar, NATO, Füze Savunma Sistemi

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Introduction

Turkey’s membership in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) since 1952 has been the most important aspect of its foreign policy. A critical juncture in Turkey’s NATO membership arrived in 2010 with the NATO Council’s decision, at its Lisbon summit, to build a missile defense shield system. After many deliberations, Turkey finally agreed to participate in NATO’s ballistic missile defense system by hosting the system radar site in September 2011. The radar was placed in Kürecik, Malatya in Turkey and became operational in March 2012. A senior official of the Obama administration argued that “this is probably the biggest strategic decision between the United States and Turkey in the past 15 or 20 years.” Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan affirms this view, “we are of the opinion that the step taken [in deploying the radar system] is important for our region. That’s why we, as the government, have decided to station the system in Turkey after broad consultations.” Turkey’s commitment to NATO’s missile defense system increases Turkey’s role in the alliance while at the same time anchoring an important dimension of its defense in the North Atlantic security structure. On the other hand, by taking such a step, Turkey encounters new systemic risks and dyadic threats originating from its neighbors in the Middle East.

This paper investigates the main dynamics of the Turkish decision to commit to the NATO missile defense system by hosting the radar site on its territory. From a realpolitik point of view, Turkey’s participation in the missile shield presents us with a theoretical puzzle as the convergence of security interests on missile defense seems relatively weak. At the same time, the rational and utilitarian calculations do not seem to indicate a positive sum gain. From a historical institutionalist point of view, the Turkish decision could be seen as a result of a path-dependent process. We use these alternative yet complementary explanations with the ultimate aim that, together, they could enable us to assess the Turkish decision in a more coherent fashion.

The Ballistic Missile Defense System

Lawrence Freedman argues that “from the start of the nuclear age, it had been almost a moral imperative to develop some system that would make it possible to defend against an incoming missile or bomber attack.”4 This is why various American administrations had attempted different formulations of missile defense systems throughout the Cold War and in the post-Cold War era. The idea to deploy a missile defense system against ballistic missiles that may target NATO installations and populations has been among the plethora of new paths and issue areas that NATO has been involved in recently. In 2008, American President Barack Obama advanced the most recent missile defense system as the “phased adaptive approach,” as part of a NATO strategy. The next step came at the Lisbon summit of November 2010, when NATO members agreed to build a missile defense system that would provide defense against possible ballistic missile attacks on NATO installations and populations.

The missile ballistic defense system, designed to protect the territories of all NATO members, involves the installation of a number of missile detection radars and antimissile interceptors on European territory. Specifically, the system includes an X-band radar in Turkey, ground-based missile interceptors in Romania and Poland (deployment to be in 2015 and 2018 respectively), American Aegis cruisers deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean and at Spain’s Rota Naval Station, and a command and control headquarters in Germany. Phased in over the decade, the system aims to link the European missile defense system with American national missile defense. Accordingly, Turkey agreed to host the X-band radar site to be built in Kürecik, which is located approximately five hundred kilometers from Iran. As Mark Hertling, the US Army commander in Europe, declared “US forces started to man Malatya’s Kürecik radar site on February 26, 2012”.5 As of the spring of 2012, Turkey is responsible for the security of the radar and its surroundings, while the US is in charge of its operation. The data obtained from the radar is passed on to the system’s command and control headquarters at Ramstein Air Base in Germany and to the Rota Naval Base in Spain.

The overall aim is to create a defensive umbrella to protect all NATO members from ballistic missile attacks originating from the Middle East. The public packaging of the missile defense system, however, conceals many of important dynamics that the system brings about. These range from concerns about the feasibility of the system to the unintended strategic consequences of deploying missile defense systems.

Among international relations theories, realism has held a consistent view on state preferences, convergence of security interests, threat perceptions, and alliance formation; as long as a state sees in its interest to commit to an alliance it will continue to be a part of it. Much of the literature that focuses on Turkey’s place in the NATO alliance affirms this logic; collective defense and extended deterrence have served Turkey’s security interests

since 1952. In line with this realist logic, Turkey’s commitment to the NATO missile defense system could be based on its security interests and a cost-benefit analysis. Turkey’s increased role in the NATO alliance would enhance its position in the transatlantic security system. Furthermore, Turkey also lacks a comprehensive air defense system and the planned missile defense system could help strengthen this military deficiency. In line with this reasoning, Proposition I is:

**Proposition I:** Turkey agreed to host the radar site on its territory because there was a convergence of security interests between Turkey and NATO on this issue and the material security benefits it would reap from the missile defense system outweigh the possible material costs.

Although straightforward and simple, this line of argument, we argue, does not fully account for many of the dynamics of the missile defense system, including the strategic rationale and the feasibility of the project. There are several reasons why joining the NATO missile defense system might hamper Turkish material interests. These range from security and economic interests, as well as reasons that pertain to Turkey’s geostrategic position and recent rapprochement with its neighbors. The missile defense system puts Turkey on the front-line of NATO’s security strategy. Consequently, Turkey might be attracting unnecessary military strikes on its territory by the virtue of hosting a radar site. Second, under the currently planned system, a missile originating from the Middle East and headed towards Europe would be intercepted in Turkish airspace, leading to possible nuclear, biological or chemical debris to be dispersed across Turkish territory. This would mean that Turkey would bear the main load for the protection of the European landmass. One of the material benefits for agreeing to these material costs is related to the Turkish concerns *vis-à-vis* nuclear proliferation in the region. However, it is not clear to what extent Turkey feels threatened by Iran’s nuclear program.6 Turkish officials have, on many occasions, affirmed their belief in the civilian nature of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Finally, Turkey, by tying itself to the missile defense initiative, will automatically align its threat perception along Washington’s lines, effectively limiting the range of possible foreign policy options that Turkey may want to consider. This is particularly important as Turkey does not seem to perceive Iran as a threat to the extent that the US does. This weakens the argument based on the convergence of security interests within the utilitarian logic.

These material concerns are coupled with questions about the system itself as there are also severe issues with regards to the technical feasibility of the system that presently has had varying successes under “ideal” test conditions. The tests conducted so far do not take into account the multiple diversionary tactics and decoys that a potential attacker can employ to overwhelm the missile defense system. Throughout the past decade, American scientists have repeatedly published reports questioning the feasibility and utility of the system.7

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Given these tangible security costs, the school of *realpolitik* would predict that Turkey would refrain from participating in NATO’s ballistic missile defense system. In other words, from a realist perspective, one would expect that Turkey would probably not want to attract unnecessary threats to itself, especially if the convergence of security interests is weak and the potential costs outweigh the possible material benefits. This in turn presents us with the following question: why did Turkey agree to participate in the missile defense system as the host of the X-band radar site although the immediate costs seem to outweigh the benefits?

One can read Turkey’s commitment to the alliance from an alternative angle that not only can account for the possible loopholes in the *realpolitik*-based logic, but also shed light on some empirical anomalies about the Turkish commitment to NATO. We argue that the school of historical institutionalism can both explain this empirical puzzle as well as Turkey’s past and present relations with NATO. 8 Historical institutionalism stresses that “many of the contemporary implications of temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether these be formal rules, policy structures, or norms.”9 Turkey’s continued support for the alliance and agreement to be a part of the missile defense system can be understood by reference to the institutional structures that shape the policy options of policy-makers. This paper advances Proposition II as:

**Proposition II:** Turkey agreed to host the radar site on its territory because its membership in NATO since 1952 has created a path dependency, i.e., even if its material benefits are not clearly met, it still fully participates with NATO decisions due to historical and institutional dynamics.

Consequently, even if the material interests diverge at given periods of time, the path-dependent logic keeps the Turkish foreign policy in line with the NATO choices. This is partly because past decisions and commitments have created an institutional framework for Turkey’s role in the alliance10 that makes it hard to break away from. The range of policy options, including what Turkey perceives its identity be, is shaped by historical legacies and institutions. Once Turkey became a NATO member in 1952 for security considerations, a path-dependent logic has reinforced Turkey’s commitment within the alliance. Positive incentives to follow the path, and negative feedback to break from it, have reinforced Turkey’s position in the alliance. However, this path-dependent logic that has manifested itself in Turkey’s commitment to the missile defense system should not be understood as detrimental; in fact, Turkey’s participation could be seen as a reinforcement mechanism as the structure of NATO becomes further entrenched and strengthened.

To sum up, we argue that a historical institutionalist-based explanation of Turkey’s decision to host the radar site is more salient than only a utilitarian-based explanation.

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10 Kreps, “Perverse Institutionalism”.
This does not mean that the utility-based explanations do not have merit; they do shed significant light into the Turkish decision to host the radar, specifically from the material calculations point of view. However, the utilitarian view of convergence of security interests argument seems relatively weak in comparison to the historic institutionalist explanation. We argue that a case of path dependency can be made with respect to the resilience of the NATO alliance in general, and Turkey’s commitment to the alliance in particular.

Theories of Foreign Policy Making and Alliance Participation

Realists argue that states live in a self-help system that requires them to take measures to ensure survival. The anarchic structure of the system creates systemic uncertainty that makes states wary of each other’s intentions.11 Although there are many different versions of realism, such as classical, neoclassical, defensive structural, and offensive structural realism, in varying degrees, all realisms argue that states take steps to ensure their security.12 This line of reasoning has been at the core of the literature that tries to explain alliance formation and the sustainment of a state’s commitment to it.

As Stephen Walt argues, Western European states committed to NATO because they perceived the Soviet Union as a threat; consequently, as he later argued, NATO would cease to function with the fall of the Soviet Union.13 Given the skeptical view of NATO’s future in the immediate Post-Cold War era, realism’s predictive power to explain the persistence of NATO seems short of expectations. The persistence of NATO, both during the Cold War and in its aftermath, has created important questions for theorists of international relations. Two decades onwards, the question remains as to why and how do alliances persist beyond the immediate goals under which they are created? One strong line of argument is the level of institutionalization of a particular alliance determines its survivability.14 NATO has been repeatedly pointed out as the most successful military alliance in the history of the international system, such that it not only achieved its

12 From here on we will be referring to defensive structural realism as our main point of reference in the realist literature. This is so not just because defensive structural is more established than offensive structural realism, but because, as John Mearsheimer concedes, offensive structural realism’s main focus are great powers which aim to maximize their relative power capabilities with an ultimate bid for hegemony. See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York, WW. Norton & Company, 2001. Therefore, since the relative power position of Turkey in the international system falls short of the scope of offensive realism, it would be redundant on our part to go over this theory’s implications and predictions for our case. Likewise, we do not go over the classical realist approach in our literature review for our case.
immediate goals but also continued to further institutionalize in serving the interests of its members. One might also point out that NATO not only deters a potential aggressor from attack, but it also lessens the possibility of military confrontation among its members.15

A military alliance is an institution with a set of formal and informal rules and regulations that member parties have agreed to cooperate under. Institutions are created at critical junctures, which necessitate the involved parties to agree upon common issues and to pool their resources to achieve their objectives. Institutionalization creates further incentives to cooperate and discourages defection.16 As an institution, NATO is a critical factor shaping its member states' foreign policy choices and defection is most often very costly and less likely given the socialization within the institution.17 For example, the centralization of military command and a common nuclear strategic policy are clear examples of institutionalization of the alliance that provides increasing returns for the alliance partners. The strong partners of the alliance can capitalize on the resources and territory of smaller partners, whereas smaller partners can also have a voice in the regular meetings of the heads of state.18 This is also a clear interaction between the utilitarian and path-dependent logics.

In addition to this material dimension on the increased benefits with cooperation and higher costs with exiting from an institution, institutionalization is also a social process.19 The sociological aspect of historical institutionalism hints that institutions also shape and form the interests and identities of the member states.20 In other words, the interests of member states become endogenous to the process of institutionalization.21

15 Karl Deutsch’s main argument attest to this basic function, specifically a collective defense institution alters the long-term expectations of its members about the peaceful resolution of conflicts among themselves and Franco–Germany and Turkish–Greek enduring rivalries are cases in point. Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957.

16 Of course, this does not mean that defection is impossible, as witnessed when France withdrew from NATO’s military command in 1965; however, the French did not completely withdraw from NATO and the 1965 decision was reversed in 2008 by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy. A more poignant example is the Greece’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1975 to protest against the perceived threat from Turkey and frustration with the US for not protecting them. However, Greece reversed its decision by returning to NATO in 1981. See Riza Sotiris, “Atlanticism and Europeanism in Greek Foreign and Security Policy in the 1970s”, South East European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, p. 51-66.


To further clarify, the deeper entrenchment and institutionalization of an institution is, the more likely that the actor’s preferences will be shaped within the parameters of the overall objectives of the institution. This dual characteristic of institutions is embedded in historical processes and the institutionalization of an alliance. First, “an institution performs effectively when it provides net benefits to allies by serving their collective and individual goals within the parameters they establish.”\(^{22}\) Second, constitutive norms make states commit “to the alliance not only for the functions it performs, but also for what is represents. Norms generate a form of ‘loyalty’ to the institution which raises the cost of exit and activates the use of voice.”\(^{23}\) In short, once a state accedes to an institution such as NATO, both utilitarian and path-dependent logic shapes its foreign policy choices in a complementary manner. This provides us with a theoretical basis for investigating the complementarity between our Proposition I and II, specifically between the utilitarian and path-dependent logics.

We argue that both of these dynamics operate in the institutionalization of NATO’s ballistic missile defense system; we can observe this particularly in explaining Turkey’s commitment to the alliance. While both the dual characteristics of institutionalization have been in place throughout the Cold War, Turkey’s commitment to the alliance in the absence of a common adversary deserves an explanation. Even in the absence of a strong adversary that unites the members of the alliance, NATO has persisted due to a path-dependent logic which includes both utilitarian calculations and the role of norms. From the utility-based perspective, the entrenched alliance structure, including the available platforms of communication among member states, benefits intelligence sharing and the intertwining of militaries in each other’s territory continued to benefit the members of the alliance. As a whole, NATO continues to provide more security benefits for its members than the individual measures that the members of the alliance would have achieved on their own. In line with Proposition I, from this rationalist element one can achieve some explanatory power; however, there is more to this institutional persistence. A complementary argument can be advanced using the sociological aspects of historical institutionalism.

The material pooling of sources has meant that the members of the alliance have had to communicate with one another through a common language. For example, military personnel had to be exchanged, coordination of doctrine and tactics had to be accomplished, rules of engagement were devised, weaponry and weapons systems had to be standardized, and NATO installations and pipelines had to be constructed across member states. The allies needed to have procedures to agree and disagree. Accordingly, the alliance had to have meetings and platforms for discussion in and through which member states communicated with one another. It is within such platforms that heads of states, commanders-in-chief, foreign ministers, and top bureaucrats meet together to negotiate over the particular tasks that lay ahead of them. As a result, the actors of the alliance have become socialized in and through these many meetings, which result in the circulation and construction of norms of behavior, along with a calibration of understandings.

\(^{22}\) Rafferty, “An Institutionalist Reinterpretation”, p. 345.
\(^{23}\) Ibid, p. 345-46.
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The complementarity between the utilitarian and path-dependent logic trains is illustrated by the Turkish commitment to NATO that has fairly been consistent since 1952.\textsuperscript{24} This point is further bolstered by the fact that even political parties that opposed NATO as an opposition party have found themselves to be committing to the alliance. What explains this continuation in Turkish foreign policy? Although the strategic environment of Turkey has changed over time in the last 60 years, one cannot help but notice the increased commitment to NATO and its policies. This is evident in the most recent developments of the Arab Spring and in the NATO missile defense system. Our point is that the institutionalization of NATO shapes and forms the foreign policy of the country regardless of who is in power or what kind of an international distribution of power exists at the systemic level. This, in turn, attests to the power of the historical institutionalist explanation. We argue that concerns of “individual” national security give way to committing to the alliance as a whole in the process. In other words, the norms, rules, and regulations of the alliance set in motion certain dynamics that result in loyalty to the institution. The internalization of the norms of the institution takes precedence over short-term rationalist concerns, while commitment to the institution continues even if the relative absence of a convergence of security interests. This, we argue, is the main logic behind the missile defense system and Turkey’s commitment to it. The next section addresses the effects of institutionalization and the utilitarian and path dependent logics on the Turkish decision to host the radar site for NATO.

Turkey and NATO: Utilitarian and Path Dependent Logics

When Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the dynamics of the Cold War were the main determining factor shaping both Turkish foreign policy and the emergence of the collective defense organization.\textsuperscript{25} The balance of power between the USA and the USSR transformed Turkey’s role into a southeast bastion for NATO. At the same time, it provided Turkey with a security umbrella that signaled its potential enemies that the material costs of attacking Turkey were substantial.\textsuperscript{26} The historical institutionalist school regards critical junctures as “crucial founding moments of institutional formation.”\textsuperscript{27} The critical juncture in history that led to the creation of NATO was the end of the Second World War and the emerging tensions that started between the Allies. This was also a critical juncture for Turkey, which experienced its own security shock when the Soviet Union placed territorial demands on Turkey’s Eastern provinces and the Straits. The systemic shocks in the international environment in general and Soviet demands in particular were a necessary condition for Turkey to align its foreign policy with NATO.

\textsuperscript{25} Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, \textit{Middle Eastern Studies}, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2000, p. 103–140.
\textsuperscript{27} Theleen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics”, p. 387.
The institutionalization of NATO had many dimensions. Decision-making was centralized and resources were pooled together in an effort to achieve the alliance’s main objective – to deter a Soviet aggression toward Western Europe. As the alliance became further entrenched, the security of each state became further interdependent with the standardization of each member state’s military strategy through the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). The increasing institutionalization of the alliance had increasing returns for member states. By coordinating their national security policies and allocating their resources more efficiently, the national security policy of each member state was organized collectively, rather than having to devise and plan for a Soviet aggression on their own.

During this period, Turkey’s security became heavily dependent on the NATO alliance. As William Hale points out, “in its organization and equipment, the Turkish army of 1948 had altered little from that of the 1920s. It was into this extremely backward military machine that the United States began to pour new equipment – artillery, trucks, tanks and fighter aircraft - which were designed to help Turkey to fulfill her commitments to the Western alliance.”28 Besides material standardization, there was also a socialization process. “Inside NATO, the character of Turkey’s officer corps began to change. Younger officers, who were open to technology and the strategy of modern warfare, acquired a sense of importance and confidence they had never enjoyed before. They visited other countries and discussed the world’s problems with officers who presented perspectives different from their own.”29 Turkey’s entire military doctrine was standardized along NATO lines. For example;

The American military authorities also promoted a massive reform of the military education system. Navy schools were established for special training in aircraft gunnery, signals, medicine, ordnance, transport and engineering in the army, for mine and submarine warfare in the navy, and pilot training, radio aeronautics and meteorology in the air force, besides several other technical branches.30

From a path-dependent perspective, “what happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point in time.”31 Since these entire early developments affected Turkish stance towards NATO in later times, both during the Cold War, and in its immediate aftermath, the path-dependent logic of NATO membership has had a significant influence on Turkey’s foreign and security policy orientation.

30 Ibid.
In the post-Cold War era, NATO has become increasingly more active and visible. NATO has been involved in humanitarian interventions, peace-keeping missions, counterterrorism, and, most recently, antipiracy patrols off the shores of East Africa. NATO also undertook an initiative in the Arab spring by contributing to the downfall of Gaddafi’s regime in Libya in 2011. Given the institutionalized nature of NATO, it seems almost certain that member states found it in their interest to pursue their foreign and security agendas through utilizing the alliance structure. In this reformulated NATO, Turkey’s role in international security has especially increased in light of the new developments in the Middle East; specifically Turkey has shown itself as a critical regional player in the region with its active engagement. Turkey has been an active player in NATO’s mission in Afghanistan since 2003, even taking over the command of NATO forces repeatedly. Turkey also played a substantial role in NATO’s mission in Bosnia in 2004, participated in the UN force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, in 2006. Given all these activities, it would seem that Turkey’s participation in the missile defense would be a logical spillover.

To reiterate the main question in this paper as to why Turkey committed to the missile defense system by hosting the radar site, the answer seems to lie in both utilitarian and historical factors that have led Turkey to make a decision in favor of this system. In line with Proposition I, according to the utilitarian logic, adherence to an existing path is beneficial, “because deviation will make the individual worse off than will adherence.” Turkey has always emphasized its liabilities as a prolonged NATO member during this process. Turkey chose to reiterate its commitment to NATO for the material benefits that could be derived by staying on the existing path, rather than choosing an alternative path. In addition, we propose two arguments that can explain Turkey’s behavior from a utility-based perspective. First, Turkey’s decision to deploy NATO-led missile shield would militarily contribute to Turkey’s security. Turkey lacks a missile defense system and participation in the NATO system would enable Turkey to reap an extra, important security-related benefit. It would acquire the capabilities to defend its own airspace with NATO assets. As Turkey does not have air defense system apart from the F-16 and F-4 fighters, it has supported the plans for the construction of a common missile defense shield since 2002. One of the three conditions that Turkey had put insisted on to NATO for the deployment of the radar on its own territory was that the shield would be effective enough to protect the whole Turkish territory and airspace instead of only a part of it. The fact that Iran and Russia are not in hostile relations with Turkey today does not mean that this situation will continue. As a non-nuclear power in the region facing a range of states with nuclear capacity, it is a rational, security-based calculation for Turkey to

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32 See the references on footnote 6.
34 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” p. 940.
35 There are some recent discussions to install theater defense systems such as the American Patriot systems. Murat Yetkin, “Ankara’dan Kalkana Şart Var, Veto Yok”, Radikal Online, 7 November 2010, http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx@aType=RadikalHaberDetayV3&ArticleID=1027794&Date=27.11.2011&CategoryId=100 (Accessed on 30 November 2011).
36 Ibid.
host the radar site on its territory. These are all utilitarian, rationalist concerns based on Turkish calculations of material interests and empirically support Proposition I. However, specifically with respect to Iran, Turkey today does not have a similar threat perception as the rest of the NATO countries, implying that the convergence of security interests over Iran is a weaker argument. Thus, the realist version of the utility-based arguments for Turkish decision to host the radar site is not empirically supported. This, however, is only one side of the story. Although there are clear security benefits to be gained, there are also serious security costs associated with hosting the radar site. It is for this reason that we argue that the utility-based explanation must be supplemented by the sociological dimension of the historical institutionalist approach. Let us briefly go over some of the consequences of committing to the missile defense system and thereby show how utilitarian based calculations have its relative shortcomings in fully accounting the Turkish decision to host the radar site. The most important part of the missile defense system is to detect missile launches that require advanced detection capabilities that are in close proximity to target countries. A key part of the missile defense system includes asking Turkey to host a forward X-band ground based radar site on its territory. Iran and Russia, therefore, understandably see this development as detrimental to their missile arsenal, because a missile defense system limits their retaliatory options. Turkey, therefore, by agreeing to host the forward radar sites, is unintentionally sending threatening signals to Iran and Russia. This is coupled with the Turkish concerns about the possible impact of nuclear proliferation in the region.

A dyadic dimension of the missile defense system is related to Iran and its nuclear program. Although Turkey and Iran enjoy friendly relations, a nuclear Iran on her Eastern border could still pose a security threat for Turkey. This is reflected by Prime Minister Erdoğan’s words “Nuclear weapons are a threat, no matter who owns it; they are still a threat.” Yet, the Turkish government was careful not to single out Iran as the main target of the system. This is precisely why the negotiations between Turkey and NATO on the defense system showed that Turkey wanted to both secure its security interests and its favorable relations with Iran. Therefore, Turkey demanded that the project be implemented as a NATO project rather than as an American project and tried to persuade other NATO members not to refer to any specific state such as Syria and Iran as targets of the missile defense system in related documents. This was problematic as the US position on the system is that the “the architecture of the system is designed to provide the optimal protection against ballistic missile threats from the Middle East, from Iran in particular, the system is not in any way directed against Russia.” However, this raised significant security costs as “Turkey does not want to experience any crisis with its neighbors due to missile defense shield and it would agree on the plan only if it is

39 Ibid.
40 Shanker, “U.S. Hails Deal with Turkey on Missile Shield”.

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implemented under NATO leadership, in the framework of NATO’s ‘collective defense’ doctrine, which is secured under Article 5 of the NATO agreement.” By persuading other NATO members to remove references to Iran from the document, Turkey hoped to hinder the prospective deterioration of its relations with Iran. In other words, Turkey hoped to defend itself from Iranian criticism by stating that the project is a general NATO project. Vecdi Gönül, former defense minister, summarized this view as “NATO is an institution responsible for the general defense of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance and it does not target any specific country.”

However, contrary to the official declarations, missile defense systems unavoidably bring about new strategic relations. This strategic rationale is an inherent feature of international relations, commonly known as the security dilemma – steps taken to secure one spell the insecurity of others. It is no surprise then Russia and Iran have both signaled extreme discomfort with the missile defense system. Russian President Medvedev has explicitly stated that his country will be deploying short- and medium-range tactical nuclear weapons as close as possible to those countries that will host the missile defense system sites. In other words, Russia is clearly signaling that, in case of hostilities, their first targets would be countries hosting the defense system’s sites. Accordingly, the close proximity of Turkey to target countries makes Turkey a unique cost-bearer in the alliance. Other NATO countries would be free-riding on Turkey’s extra burden of being the first target of possible strikes. This view is reflected in the statements of the Turkish opposition, “the deployment of this radar system puts Turkey under great risk. Turkey might be dragged into a war with Iran. Following a probable Israeli strike on Iran, the first target Iran will hit would be Kürecik.” This suggests that Turkey is paying a much higher security cost in the NATO alliance. At the same time, this also shows that the convergence of security interests between Turkey and the US is relatively weaker, thereby weakening the realist dimension of the utilitarian explanation. What Turkey gets, compared to what it gives up, from the missile defense shield is very different from, say, the situation of Portugal or Belgium. NATO members such as Portugal and Belgium would enjoy the security benefits of the shield as they are geographically distant to Iran. Turkey, as the frontline member of the alliance, would be bearing the cost of preventive and preemptive strikes on its territory, both because of its radar sites and proximity to target countries. The so-called kill vehicles of the missile defense system can more reliably protect rear countries than it can protect countries that are closer to the missile launch site. This is a significant material cost that the utilitarian logic does not fully explain and lessens the validity of Proposition I.

41 Ibid.
The possible political costs that Turkey will have to bear become evident with the Iranian government’s position. Several Iranian government officials have expressed their discomfort about Turkey’s agreement to be a part of the missile defense system. Boroujerdi, the chairman of parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, stated: “It was a great mistake of yours allowing NATO anti-missile systems to be installed in your country, as in case of a threat, the military base of Incirlik will be primarily targeted, and then, Turkish-Iranian relations will be of no importance and the focus will be on Iran’s national security.” There is more to this issue than meets the eye. Iran has also explicitly stated that it will target Turkey, if Israel, a non-NATO country, were to carry out unilateral strikes on Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, the missile defense system draws Turkey into a strategic interaction where there are clear security costs. These security costs are clearly illustrated by General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ aerospace division, who stated, “should we be threatened, we will target NATO’s missile defense shield in Turkey and then hit the next targets.” Similarly, Hussein Ibrahimi, the vice-president of the Iranian parliamentary committee on foreign and security policy, declared:

In the case of an attack [on Iran], targeting defense shield installations on Turkish territory is our natural right that we are sure to carry out. Our armed forces have already planned for certain tactical instrument. This system is designed to protect the Zionist Israeli regime, NATO is only a caveat. Turkey shares the responsibility by allowing its territory to be used for this system. This is Turkey’s burden, it should not have agreed.

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast echoes this logic, as “strengthening NATO’s presence in this region itself would be counterproductive to both regional security and also that of Turkey.”

The declarations from Iranian and Russian officials clearly demonstrate their perceptions of the threat that Turkey seems to pose by hosting the radar site so close to their territories. Iran seems to believe that the missile defense system is designed to protect Israel. There are several unintended strategic consequences of this interaction.

Israel, although not part of NATO, is perceived to benefit from the NATO missile defense system without any contribution from its side, i.e., it would free ride on NATO’s new system. Turkey, on the other hand, would be contributing to the extended deterrence of Israel, without an added benefit to its own security. In contrast, it might even become a target for Iran precisely for this reason. Turkey becomes, as officials in Tehran suggest, an open target to Iranian missiles if Israel decided to unilaterally attack Iran. The important concern for us is whether the benefits of hosting the radar site worth the possible costs? In other words, is Proposition I empirically verified?

This also seems to be the main concern for Turkish government officials as Turkey has set several conditions to participate in the missile defense system. First, Turkey demanded that Iran should not be openly referred to in the mission statement for the missile system. This is also summarized by Volkan Bozkır, the head of the Turkish Parliament’s foreign affairs commission as “We gave another assurance that Turkey will in no way stand by any action that may harm Turkey’s close friend Iran.”50 Second, Turkey was adamant that data obtained by the missile detection radars is not to be shared with non-NATO members, specifically Israel.51 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu declared “We will provide support only for systems that belong to NATO and are used solely by members of NATO.”52 Nevertheless, although stated in public, these two conditions have been rendered strategically redundant. As regards to the first, all parties are aware of the fact that the missile defense system is clearly targeted toward curbing Iran’s ability to send missiles to Western targets. Whether or not Iran is named as a target in agreement documents is diplomatic lip service. Given their declarations, the Iranians seem to be aware of this. Second, although Turkey wants to send a message to Iran that it will limit the flow of information to Israel, this is not accurate, as U.S. military officials “privately maintain that data will indeed be shared with Israel.”53 Thus, it seems certain that Turkey is paying an unprecedented and costly price for agreeing to host the radar site. This is despite a Turkish official’s insistence that: “we will never allow a NATO facility to be used by a third party. I want to make this very clear. And, if this party were Israel, our attitude would be more clear and visible.”54

Leaving the rational calculations of cost-benefit analysis aside, a critical concern is with regards to the technical feasibility and claimed value of the shield to Turkish security interests. Furthermore, missile defense systems are not a new development. During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States developed missile defense systems to protect their cities and deterrent capabilities.55 Missile defense systems, however, were proven unfeasible given the wide range of options that an attacker can pursue to confuse the missile defense system. For example, both the US and the Soviet Union included decoys and other tactics to confuse and overwhelm the other side’s missile defense system. Furthermore, the invention of Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles made missile defense system futile during the Cold War.56 Just as the superpowers invested in technologies to circumvent or overwhelm each other’s missile defense systems, it is clear that Iran would follow a similar path.

Setting aside the technical feasibility of the kill vehicles of the defense system to successfully eliminate incoming missiles, there is an extra cost associated with agreeing to host the MDS radar sites.57 Given the early detection of incoming missiles and the automatic deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, there is an unavoidable lag that is worrisome for those countries whose airspace are on the flight path of incoming missiles. Reports from independent observers and scholars suggest that interception of incoming missiles is questionable.58 In fact, some of the tests conducted by the US military reveal mixed results, with a varying success rate. Furthermore, although the missile defense system might be successful in protecting NATO countries far away from Iran, it is questionable whether it can actually protect Turkey itself. This is because the radar deployed in Turkey would require additional systems to be deployed, “within hundreds of kilometers of the launch site; thus ships operating in the eastern Mediterranean could not intercept Iraqi or Iranian launches.”59 Consequently, Turkey becomes an open target and the frontline of the defense system with significant security costs. Given the proximity of Middle Eastern missile launch sites, and NATO countermeasures, it is estimated that missiles originating from the Middle East would be intercepted over Turkish airspace. Turkish policymakers are aware that only Western cities of Turkey would be covered by

56 To counter the Russian Galosh missile defense system surrounding Moscow, the Americans only needed to increase the number of MIRV tipped missiles targeting Moscow to get around the defense system. These technical issues further reveal that MDS is a costly enterprise that does not necessarily bring about the added benefit. As Russia and the United States both discovered, the best way to ensure defense was a secure second strike capability; that is to say nuclear strategic stability was only achieved by the continuation of the assured destruction. See Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.
the system, leaving Ankara in the open, therefore the MDS has little value for Turkish security.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, any nuclear, chemical or biological debris falling out from the originating missile would fall out from the skies in which it is intercepted, as reported by the American Physical Society.\textsuperscript{61} These aspects have unmistakable security implications for Turkey. Turkey would bear the cost of possible debris fallout over its territory to prevent the missile from reaching its target in Western Europe. This automatically brings forth the question: why would Ankara bear dangerous debris falling out over its skies, rather than have the missile reach its target in Europe?

To sum up, the Turkish decision to host the radar site has apparent important benefits; it gives Turkey an air defense capability that it has hitherto lacked and contributes to Turkey's defense capabilities that might be upset by Iranian nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, it exposes Turkey to new dyadic security risks from Iran and Russia; given the low rate of success of such systems, it might even make Turkey more insecure in the long run. Specifically, in line with Proposition I, whether there is a convergence of security interests question is not empirically verified. In terms of the next component of our Proposition I, whether the security benefits are worth the possible costs, the answer to that question is not straightforward enough to be answered with a definite yes. This then brings us to Proposition II – would the historical institutionalist logic complement the utilitarian logic?

The sociological dimension of the historical institutionalist school argues that institutions create shared norms and ideas among the members of an alliance. These norms, ideas, and preferences are internalized by members to shape and form their foreign policy as well. Therefore, it is not the case that members of an alliance have a completely separate and ontologically prior agenda of security interests and priorities; instead, there is standardization of security doctrines, defense policies, and threat perceptions. Institutions are products of processes of decision-making. Earlier decisions and commitments create a snowball effect by further entrenching, deepening and institutionalizing a given institution. Earlier choices made in history and the interlinking of security doctrines and defense policies have created a path dependency for alliance members.

We argue that the weight of history and institutions have an important effect on shaping Turkish security policy today with respect to the missile defense system. This has occurred in the Turkish case in an era where there seemed to be alternative paths available to follow. Specifically, the earlier decisions in committing to NATO, along with increasing returns and negative feedback, resulted in the path dependency of Turkey's further commitment to the NATO alliance. This is shown by the difficulties for Turkey to break away from the path-dependent nature of the alliance. On the other hand, if Turkey decided to remain outside of the missile defense system, it would have to bear isolation in the alliance. What is critically important here is that Turkey's decision to participate in the missile defense shield system is also motivated by the Turkish concern that non-participation would have left Turkey alone and isolated in NATO.

\textsuperscript{60} “Kalkana Türk-Fransız Çelmesi”.
\textsuperscript{61} Report of the APS Study Group.
This seemed likely in 2010 when the Turkish government was initially reluctant to support the missile defense system and this reluctance affected its relations with the US. According to American analysts, “the new NATO anti-missile shield is essentially a reinforcement of overall solidarity between the NATO members. If Turkey says a flat ‘no,’ that would be very damaging in Turkey’s standing in the alliance.” This seems to empirically verify our Proposition II. Turkish agreement to the missile defense system and more generally its continued commitment to the NATO alliance require a wider historical perspective. Accordingly, it is not just because of immediate strategic concerns that states commit to an alliance, but a wider set of variables that influence foreign policy. It is here where the sociological dimension of the historical institutionalist school becomes vital in explaining Turkey’s commitment.

Given this approach, a dilemma appeared when Turkey was confronted with a choice between NATO and its policy of “zero problems with neighbors”. In recent years, Turkey’s zero-problem policy towards its neighbors aimed at bettering relations with neighboring countries through the relaxation of tariffs and quotas, high-level official visits, and increased cooperation on international issues. Old enmities were to be cast aside in favor of trade liberalization and rapprochement. In fact, during the last decade Turkey has made important moves that were largely unthinkable before, such as the rapprochement with Middle Eastern neighbors, attempts to diffuse the conflict in the Caucasus, and trade agreements that fostered interdependence. Given this background, the deployment of the missile defense system would lead to several unnecessary costs for Turkey, such as the deterioration of economic and trade relations with Iran. On the one hand, Turkey had been a part of the Western alliance for 60 years and was committed to its collective defense norm. On the other hand, Turkey had also forged highly favorable relations with Iran as a part of its more recent zero problems policy. This is coupled with the unintended security-related consequences of the missile defense system, as discussed above. Turkey’s further commitment to the NATO alliance would not only harm Turkey’s security interests but also hamper its alternative foreign policy approach, the zero problem policy, in which Turkey had greatly invested in the recent years.

Whether or not Turkey’s zero-problem policy was to institutionalize or not is a clear test of the difficulty to break from or reverse its earlier decisions. One may argue that Turkey’s effort to advance the zero-problem policy was a sincere effort to institutionalize a certain approach to Turkey’s neighborhood. However, “new institutions often entail high fixed or start-up costs, and they involve considerable learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations.” This is why building new directions in foreign policy is often

64 “Iran Türkiye’yı Yine Vurmakla Tehdit Etti”.
hard, and path dependency in existing institutions are more likely.66 This is reflected by the Turkish President Abdullah Gül, who argued that Turkish participation in the missile defense system “testifies that there has not been an axis shift in Turkish foreign policy, and that Turkey is committed to a Western oriented foreign policy.”67 As the Turkish administration admits, Turkey’s commitment to NATO has been a path-dependent priority. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that “the radar system an effective defense measure for Turkey itself and deploying the radar system in Kürecik is not based on bilateral agreement, but is a part of the NATO program.”68

One should also note that Turkey and the rest of the NATO alliance seem a bit divided on the Iranian nuclear program. In 2010, Turkey and Brazil, as United Nations Security Council members, tried to broker a nuclear swap deal with Iran. This was designed to convince the US and Western Europe that if Iran develops a nuclear capacity for energy purposes, it should be allowed to do so. In 2010, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution on the Iranian nuclear program and Turkey voted against it. These two incidents demonstrate that Turkey does not fully agree with the rest of the NATO members on the extent to which Iran is a threat.

The divergence between Turkey and the rest of the NATO alliance over Iran in 2010 was critical in testing the strength of historical institutionalism. Even though Turkey attempted to depart from its NATO-oriented path, it nonetheless coordinated its foreign policy with the rest of the alliance members. This was partly because “pressure has been building on Turkey to clarify its position, especially at a time when most other NATO members seemingly adopted a cooperative position. If Turkey still treats NATO as the centerpiece of its defense and security policies, Turkey cannot diverge from its allies at this critical juncture.”69 This is reflected by President Gül, who declared after the Bucharest Summit of 2008, “that there cannot be any fraction or division within the Alliance in terms of security and defense.”70 Turkey’s participation in the missile defense system effectively demonstrated the pro-NATO position preferences in its foreign policy choices. These choices, as others have argued, have been built into the foreign policy orientation of Turkey for the past decades.71 As Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu stated, “if there is a

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71 See note 66.
global terrorist threat, a risk of proliferation of conventional weapons or anything related to nuclear weapons, NATO will definitely deal with these issues. Similarly, ballistic missiles are important in terms of global peace and it is an issue assessed by NATO.”

This position supports Proposition II and is in line with the expectations of historical institutionalism, as institutions shape and mold the preferences of actors. Turkey’s strong demand to refer to the project as a general NATO project, coupled with the Turkish leaders’ emphasis on the “indivisibility of security” and “collective defense,” mark the importance of certain NATO doctrines, ideas and beliefs for Turkish foreign policy makers. Such an emphasis on NATO and the common defense doctrine show how Turkey’s past commitment to the West and NATO has shaped the policymakers’ minds to pursue the already existing path to ensure its security. As one observer points out “to reject the missile defense system would have meant that Turkey is turning away from the West. By agreeing to the missile shield, Turkey further consolidates its position in NATO.”

According to NATO General Secretary Rasmussen:

Turkey’s commitment represents a critical contribution to the Alliance’s overall defense against current and emerging ballistic missile threats. Turkey’s decision will significantly contribute to NATO’s capability to provide protection to its European territory, populations and forces against the growing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.

This statement attests to the path-dependent logic of the institution, where there are not only internally generated mechanisms on the part of Turkey to follow the path, but also external support on the part of NATO officials to urge Turkey to follow the norms, perceptions, and policies of the institution. Further support for Proposition II can be seen in Turkish Defense Minister İsmet Yılmaz’s statement, who in 2011 declared:

The primary reason for NATO’s early warning radar system is to maintain the security of Europe and by the radar system, Turkey is also protecting itself. No one has a right to object a project which is only for defense purposes and said no NATO member should [say] ‘no’ when asked to protect other member states.

72 “Erdoğan Rebuffs Sarkozy over Missile Defense System”.
This is in line with the path-dependent logic, which argues that “past lines of policy condition subsequent policy by encouraging societal forces to organize along some lines rather than others, to adopt particular identities, or to develop interests in policies.”  

NATO Secretary General Rasmussen’s remarks on the missile defense system also fit Proposition II, “one security roof, that we build together, that we support together, and that we operate together. One security roof that protects us all.”

The path-dependent logic also manifests itself in the further entrenchment of the institution. President Abdullah Gül’s statement reflects this logic “our central thesis is that in matters of security and defense we [NATO] cannot be divided.” This view is reiterated in the Turkish foreign ministry’s statement, “Turkey’s hosting of early warning radar will constitute our country’s contribution to the defense system being developed in the framework of NATO’s new strategic concept. It will strengthen NATO’s defense capacity and our national defense system.” This declaration demonstrates the historical institutionalist logic that being part of NATO encourages the acceptance of and contribution to NATO’s strategic concept. Accordingly, the missile defense system is also seen as a step to further entrench NATO as it further institutionalizes the alliance by pooling resources, sharing information, and aligning the member’s threat perceptions.

In further empirical validation for Proposition II, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu declared that “every matter is discussed in NATO together. Turkey’s position should be taken into consideration here; NATO regularly reviews its security defense concept as a whole and takes necessary measures as a security organization. It is out of the question for Turkey to oppose these measures”. This also demonstrates that Turkey’s threat perceptions and foreign policy are shaped and formed in accordance with the general overture of the alliance. Turkish policymakers’ positions towards the missile defense system, then, are not merely shaped by immediate strategic concerns and utilitarian calculations but also by decades of institutionalization in the alliance. This means that current decisions reflect earlier choices made in the path. Since Turkey has committed to a Western-oriented general foreign policy since the Second World War and specifically because Turkey’s security policy has been tied to NATO, it becomes very difficult for present and future policy-makers to change the course of foreign policy. Accordingly, there seems to be a degree of complementarity between Proposition I and II.

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77 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” p. 942.
79 “Afganistan’a Muharip Asker Yok”.
Conclusion

In this article we have argued that the Turkish decision to host the radar site of the missile defense system of NATO could be explained from two different, yet complementary logic trains: interest-based utilitarian calculations and the path-dependent logic of historical institutionalism. The risks that Turkey faces in agreeing to host the radar site of the missile defense system are substantial; the empirical analysis in the paper demonstrates that Turkey’s agreement to host the radar site is costly for Turkey’s security interests. This is not to deny that there also security interests that Turkey reaps from this decision, such as the protective umbrella of the defense system, increased importance of Turkey in the NATO alliance, and a possible transfer of technology. Despite these considerable security benefits, there are also substantial security costs, ranging from worsening of its relations with Iran, potential complications with Israel, and exposing its own territory to the possibility of an attack. The utilitarian logic demonstrated in Proposition I would have provided a satisfactory answer to Turkey’s decision had the security benefits clearly exceeded the security costs. However, as the empirical analysis in this article shows, this does not seem to be clear-cut and there does not seem to be a strong positive sum gain from hosting the site in Turkey. On other hand, our Proposition II advanced that the path-dependent process of Turkey’s NATO membership explains Turkey’s commitment to the missile defense system. Our analysis shows that there is significant empirical evidence from primary sources that validates the path dependent logic of historical institutionalism. The Turkish decision to host the radar site on its own territory, therefore, could be seen as a continuity of the path-dependent nature of Turkey’s NATO-oriented security policy. Turkish officials’ stress on the role of NATO as an institution, the emphasis on NATO’s general policies and concepts, and the Turkish internalization of NATO’s institutionalized norms and strategies, provide empirical support to our historical institutionalist explanation as to why Turkey committed to the missile defense system. This explains why in face of the increased security risks of the missile defense system to Turkey, Turkey still committed itself to the NATO general strategy. This is not to disregard the utilitarian logic’s emphasis on important security benefits that system would bring about. Therefore, the Turkish decision to host the radar site of the missile defense system can be explained by the complementarity of the utilitarian and path dependent logics.

As this case study hints, NATO will emerge as a more resilient, institutionalized, and persistent alliance with the missile defense system. Turkey’s commitment to the system by agreeing to host the radar site contributes to this entrenchment. Given that the missile defense system requires strategies and resources to be coordinated and standardized within the institutional framework of NATO, we predict that member states are more likely to further commit to alliance. The theoretical perspective we adopted in this paper argues that past policies and decisions have resulted in the present integration of security policies. Accordingly, present day decisions will have their ramifications in the future as well. We expect that certain dynamics of the alliance, such as the pooling of resources, the standardization of norms, and the “collectivization of defense,” will further increase due to the rational and sociological dimensions of the institutionalization of NATO.
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