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Third-Party Intervention in International Conflicts: Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War Era

Muzaffer Ercan YILMAZ*

ABSTRACT

This article evaluates peacekeeping and peacemaking as two major third-party intervention strategies in international conflicts in the post Cold-War era. Peacekeeping is regarded as a needed strategy in situations of violent conflict, but its extensive use is criticized. The study suggests that peacekeeping should be complemented by peacemaking for effective international conflict resolution. By explaining the general characteristics of the two and the complementary relationship between them, a “contingency approach” is reached, stressing that in determining appropriate third-party intervention, different stages of an international conflict should be considered.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Third-Party Intervention, International Conflict, Conflict Resolution

Uluslararası Çatışmalarda Üçüncü Taraflın Müdahalesi: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Barış Koruma ve Oluşturma

ÖZET

Bu makale, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde yaşanan uluslararası uyuşmazlıklara ilişkin iki temel üçüncü parti müdahalesinin, barış güç ve barış tesisini çabalarını değerlendirir. Çalışmada, barış güçlerinin şiddet içeren uyuşmazlıklarındaki gerekliği ifade edilmekte, ancak bunun aşırı kullanımını ve sorunların bu temelde çözülmemeye çalışılması eleştirilmektedir. Etkin uluslararası uyuşmazlık çözülür için barış güçlerinin çok yönlü barış tesisini çabalarıyla desteklenmesi gerektiği vurgulanmaktadır. Her iki stratejinin de temel özellikleri ve aralarındaki bütünleyicilik ilişkisi açıklanarak, aynı zamanda, uygun üçüncü parti müdahalesi için uluslararası uyuşmazlığın öncelikle hangi aşamada olduğunu dikkate alınması öngören “asamalı yaklaşımdır” sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Gücü, Barış Tesisi, Üçüncü Parti Müdahalesi, Uluslararası Uyuşmazlık, Uyuşmazlık Çözümü

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Introduction

Third-party intervention is frequently seen in international conflicts. Although the end of the Cold War has resulted in many ideological shifts in international politics, this has, generally speaking, neither reduced the incidence of international conflicts nor the tendency to submit them to the intervention of third-parties.

International conflict, as used here, refers to both inter-state conflicts and domestic ones affected by the involvement of external parties. When external parties provide political, economic, or military assistance in domestic struggles, domestic conflicts inevitably assume an international dimension.

Whenever international conflicts occur, at first, it would be natural to assume that the parties should settle their own conflict, since this is their concern, their business. But due to the very nature of conflict - the tension of hostility, the lack of trust, the mutual suspicion, the impulse to secrecy, the biased communication, the lack of bi-lateral thinking, and so on-, conflicting parties are often the least equipped to design a solution by themselves. Hence, third-party intervention often becomes a necessity in the process of resolving an international conflict.

At the international level, the most visible form of third-party intervention, especially in violent international conflicts, involves the installation of peacekeeping forces. But while peacekeeping can fortify peace through stopping immediate violence, it does not by itself create peace in the full sense. Creating durable peace in situations of international conflict requires a multi-level, comprehensive approach by third-parties that should go far beyond dealing with physical violence. Such efforts that aim to transform conflict-prone conditions and hostile relationships between the parties so as to prevent the recurrence of conflict are commonly termed “peacemaking”. This article draws attention to a complementary relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking in the process of resolving international conflicts, and stresses the inefficacy of the former in isolation from the latter. In this respect, first, both strategies are described and evaluated in conjunction with post-Cold War developments. Then, the complementary relationship between them is explained in this context. A contingency approach is also reached as a concluding thought, suggesting that third-parties pay attention to the stages of conflict in determining appropriate peace strategy.
Peacekeeping in International Conflicts

Peacekeeping, in a generic sense, is an activity which involves the interposition of military and police forces between conflicting groups, either to stop violence or to prevent it. The groups to be kept apart could be state agents, paramilitaries, militia, guerrilla groups, or even mobs. What they all share is a desire to use violence against the other side as a way of conducting their conflict. Over the years, we have witnessed peacekeeping forces organized by the UN (i.e., UNFICYP on Cyprus, MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMIS in Sudan), by regional organizations (i.e., Arab League in Lebanon, OAU in Chad), and by a grouping of states (i.e., MNF in Beirut and the MFO in Sinai). As these examples make clear, peacekeeping operations are not limited to the UN efforts. But nonetheless, this organization has a special place due to its grand mission of being a guardian of international peace and security.

Ironically, despite so many practical examples, the concept of peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned anywhere in the UN charter. Indeed, the precise charter basis for many UN peacekeeping operations has remained ambiguous for decades. Peacekeeping evolved as a pragmatic solution in the early years of the organization when it became apparent that some of the Charter provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security could not be implemented as envisaged. In this respect, peacekeeping was often referred to as a "Chapter 6-and-a-half" activity, meaning that it fell somewhere between Chapter 6 (on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and Chapter 7 (on Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). The first operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was created in 1948 to supervise the truce called for by the Security Council in Palestine. Since then, 59 more peacekeeping forces have been organized and 17 of them are still on duty.

Up to the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, there were 13 UN peacekeeping operations, most of which concerned conflicts that arose after European de-colonization. Many other issues, particularly East-West conflicts, on the other hand, were dealt with outside the UN due to the lack of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As they evolved from the 1950s to the 1980s, the traditional tasks of UN peacekeeping operations included interposing between conflicting

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parties and monitoring cease-fires. These tasks were usually carried out on the grounds of three key principles: the consent of the parties, impartiality (of peacekeepers), and non-use of force.

The principle of non-use of force was especially central to UN peacekeeping for many years. In fact, more than half the UN peacekeeping operations before 1988 consisted of only unarmed military observers and not counting situational exceptions, force was used only in cases of self-defense. But non-use of force, at times, made peacekeeping forces ineffective as well. For example, in Cyprus in 1974 and in Lebanon in 1982, the presence of UN peacekeeping could not prevent the breakdown of order and subsequent foreign interventions. Nevertheless, the achievements of UN peacekeeping forces between 1948-1988 were, overall, modestly successful. They included effective freezing of many international conflicts, some reduction of competitive interventions by neighboring or major powers, and the isolation of local conflicts from the Cold-War’s ideological struggle.2

**UN Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era**

Since mid-1988, there has been a great expansion in the number of peacekeeping forces. While from 1948 to 1978, only a total of 13 peacekeeping forces were set up, and in the following ten-year period, no new forces were established, from May 1988 to October 1993, a further twenty forces were created. As of June 2005, the number of UN peacekeeping operations has reached 60, 17 of which are still operating in the field. These involve 6,6574 military personnel and civilian police.3

A main reason for this expansion has been the increased capacity of the UN Security Council to agree on action in security crises after the end of the Cold War. The decreasing ideological clashes between the US and Soviet Union manifested itself most clearly in the decline of the veto at the Security Council. For instance, from 1945 to 1990, the permanent members of the Security Council cast the following number of vetoes: China, 3; France, 18; United Kingdom, 30; US, 69; and the Soviet Union, 114. Then between June 1990 and May 1993, there was no single

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veto. One exception occurred in May 1993 when Russia blocked a resolution on financing the peacekeeping force on Cyprus. With this exception, the post-Cold War capacity of the Security Council to reach agreement has survived and constituted a key reason for the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations.

A further reason for the expansion of peacekeeping operations is also linked with the end of the Cold War in that the post-Cold War era has generally generated an increasing need for international peacekeeping forces. For example, in the early 1990s, a series of peace agreements on Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and Cambodia called for impartial international forces to assist in implementing ceasefires, troop withdrawals, and elections. Also, the collapse of two federal communist states, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, produced many ethnic conflicts that called for active UN interventions.

Finally, after the end of the Cold War, the major powers were less likely than before to see an international conflict as part of a challenge from their major global adversary that required a unilateral military response. Hence, the major powers were more willing to see a response emerging within a UN framework.

Apart from the numerical increase in peacekeeping forces, since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations have also involved a great number of activities that have been either totally new or implemented on a much larger scale than before, such as:

- Monitoring and even running local elections, as in Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, the Congo, and East Timor (now independent Timor-Leste).
- Protecting certain areas as “safe areas” from adversary attacks so that people feel secure at least in these areas.
- Guarding the weapons surrendered by or taken from the parties in conflict.
- Ensuring the smooth delivery of humanitarian relief supplies during an ongoing conflict, as typically the case in Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, and Sudan.
- Assisting in the reconstruction of state functions in war-torn societies, as in Bosnia Herzegovina, El Salvador, the Congo, East Timor, and Liberia.⁴

There cannot be any objection, in principle, to developing and expanding peacekeeping tasks, as new circumstances call for new forms of action. Moreover, the opportunity for the decline of major-power confrontations after the end of the Cold War should be utilized for enhancing international peace and security.

But on the other hand, many of the expanded tasks of UN peacekeeping operations proved to be problematic in practice. For example, assisting democracy or certain governmental functions in states that have experienced civil wars depend upon local cooperation and when this cooperation is denied, serious problems begin. Likewise, the establishment of safe areas in war-torn societies threatened the impartiality of the UN as peacekeeping units utilized force to establish such areas and to protect them from external attacks. Even in the case of humanitarian relief, the delivery of aid often produced a failure of the UN personnel to think deeper about the root causes of conflicts. In other words, focusing on satisfying immediate physical needs of people, like food or medical assistance, little or no attention has been devoted to the problems that created the need for aid and policies for tackling them.

Above all, the central problem in the expansion of UN peacekeeping tasks today is the blurring of the distinction between peacekeeping and coercive action. Providing order in many conflicting areas of the world inevitably resulted in increasing militarization of peace missions. This, then, forced UN peacekeeping forces face a serious dilemma: remaining passively impartial or establishing order, even at the cost of the use of force. The latest examples reveal that UN peacekeeping forces take a more activist mission in which there has been a much reduced emphasis on consent and non-use of force. As a matter of fact, many post-Cold War peacekeeping forces, such as UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II in Somalia, or UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea, have been set up largely within the framework of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, downgrading the consent of conflicting parties and


leaving greater room for the use of force, as needed. This reduced emphasis on consent and non-use of force was caused by a desire to overcome the past weaknesses of peacekeeping, such as in the Middle East in 1967 and in 1974 on Cyprus. In addition, there has been a need for a new approach to consent, for in cases of armed conflicts, a peacekeeping force cannot base its existence on the consent of every local leader.

However, the increasing militarization of UN peacekeeping forces leads to many serious problems. One is that any strong use of force in war-torn societies frequently involves killing or injuring civilians, as well as adversaries. When this happens, as it did in Somalia in the early 1990s, the UN, in general, and its leading members, in particular, risk being accused of acting in a colonial manner. Second, the use of force inevitably undermines the impartiality of peacekeeping forces. This, in turn, leads to a decline in the credibility of peacekeepers. Lastly, the UN system of decision making is not well geared to controlling major uses of force. When violent situations call for heavier tactics, disagreements tend to arise among the participants of peacekeepers regarding the degree of UN control. This was particularly the case during the Bosnian conflict in which United Kingdom and France were reluctant to follow UN authority on the ground in Bosnia.

**Evaluation: The Efficacy of UN Peacekeeping in International Conflicts**

In coping with violent international conflicts, no doubt, peacekeeping has its own utility. Especially when adversaries are engaged in mutual violence or armed clashes, peacekeeping appears to be the most urgent strategy. Until this violence is stopped, it is unlikely that any attempts to resolve competing interests, to change negative attitudes, or to alter socio-economic circumstances giving rise to conflict will be successful.

Moreover, in the absence of peacekeeping forces, any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative may find it easier to provoke armed clashes with the other side, since there is no impartial buffer between the sides which can act as a restraining influence. The absence of a suitable control mechanism may enable even a small group of people

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committed to violence to wreak enormous havoc, whereas the presence of an impartial third force can be an important factor for stability.

However, the problematic issue regarding peacekeeping in practice is the expanded use of this strategy, especially since the end of the Cold War, which leads to the increasing militarization of peace missions. Rather than turning to increasingly militarized solutions - a habit that pervades thinking about conflict management at the international level - measures should also be taken to address the root causes of conflicts and to heal them. Otherwise, just by stopping violence or providing humanitarian assistance, the conflicts which the international community must cope with cannot be resolved in the full sense.

In the final analysis, peacekeeping, despite its utility, is a “palliative”, not a cure. Peacekeeping forces cannot directly resolve conflicts. All they can do is manage them for a period of time to allow people to deal with them in an atmosphere not poisoned by death and destruction. In order for international conflicts to be resolved, peacekeeping should be complemented by a comprehensive peace strategy, peacemaking.

**Peacemaking in International Conflicts**

Peacemaking by third-parties involves a combination of multi-level efforts that go far beyond peacekeeping. The major difference between the two is that while peacekeeping activities focus on the behavioral component of conflict, peacemaking concentrates on the conditions giving rise to conflict, with the aim of altering them for the better to terminate the recurrence of the issue. Thus, peacemaking necessitates much time and more efforts by third-parties from many different angels.

At the international level, the peacemaking task has been carried out by a wide variety of intermediaries, ranging from individuals, such as, the US Secretary of State or the President of Egypt, to such organizations as the UN, International Committee of Red Cross, and non-governmental organizations. Such a heterogeneous collection of intermediaries raises questions about factors contributing to the success of peacemaking.

**"Mediable" Situations: Timing and Acceptance of Third-Parties**

In this regard, all intermediaries or mediating bodies first confront the crucial problem of timing. That is, when should they intervene? More
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specifically, when are third-party initiatives likely to be acceptable to the parties involved in an intense conflict?

Most analysts and practitioners of intermediary activity have argued that in order for the parties to accept, or ask for, third-party intervention, the conflict must be "ripe". The term ripeness refers to the condition of "mutually hurting stalemate" in a conflict situation. A mutually hurting stalemate begins when one side realizes that it is unable to achieve its aims, resolve the problem, or win the conflict by itself; it is completed when the other side reaches the same conclusion. Losing hope for victory and wanting to avoid further costs, the parties look around for a convenient third-party to make them settle. At this point, the conflict is considered ripe for third-party intervention.

Apart from ripeness, there are several other conditions determining the acceptance and success of third-parties. In the conflict resolution literature, it is suggested that third-parties possess the following characteristics and qualities in the process of peacemaking as well:

- **Perceived Distance From Attaining Goals in Conflict**
  This means that third-party candidates should have a low level of direct interest in the eventual outcome of the conflict. In other words, the third-parties' aim in intervening in the conflict should not clash, or directly clash, with the aim of the parties.

- **Little Likelihood of Exploiting the Parties**
  The intervention-by third parties is often legitimized by the goal of conflict reduction.

  In reality, however, the desire to make peace as the only motive is hardly the case. In some cases, a conflict may threaten to escalate and draw in additional parties. Actors fearing such escalation and expansion may seek to reduce the conflict to avoid becoming involved in hostilities. In some others, third-parties intervene in a conflict to increase their influence on the parties. They may hope to win the gratitude of one or both parties, and this gratitude is reserved to be used for a later purpose.

  As these examples reveal, the aim claimed by third-parties in conflict reduction is usually intertwined with other motives, perhaps best described within the context of power politics. Yet the important point

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here is that while third-parties may seek some benefits out of their intervention, and this can be natural, their action ought not to threaten any immediate interests of the parties in conflict. Otherwise, the parties may fear exploitation and refuse third-party intervention. In order for them to accept outside help, they must be convinced that the relevant third-party has no direct stake in the conflict in providing assistance.

- **Capacity to Help**

Acceptance of mediation also depends on the expectation of the parties of attractive outcomes for themselves. The most obvious motive is the expectation that mediation will provide an outcome more favorable than the outcome gained by continued conflict; that is, a way out. The parties also hope that mediation will produce an agreement when direct negotiation is not possible or will provide a more favorable settlement than can be achieved directly by the parties. In any case, the acceptance of mediation is based on such cost-benefit calculations. Thus, third-parties must be capable of serving the expectations and needs of the parties in conflict.

- **Possession of Mediation Skills**

Finally, to be welcomed by the parties and to successfully handle the mediation process, third-parties should possess basic mediation skills. These include - but are not limited to- setting an agenda, carefully planning negotiation stages (between the parties), reviewing key issues and concepts in the conflict, searching for a solution rather than analyzing responsibility, calling for specific exercises and thought processes which might move the parties from conflictive thinking to creative design, promoting ideas and making suggestions towards a solution after negotiation is well advanced, being sensitive to the needs of the parties, and maintaining neutrality while remaining in contact with the parties.11

**How Does The International Mediation Process Work?**

The mediators who intervene in international conflicts basically use three modes to accomplish their purposes- *communication*, *formulation*, and *manipulation*, usually in that order.

When conflict has made direct contact between the parties impossible, thereby preventing them from talking to each other and from mak-

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ing concession without appearing weak or loosing face, the mediator can serve as communicator. In this situation, it simply acts as a conduit, opening contacts and carrying messages. This role is completely passive, with no substantive contribution by the mediator.

The second mode of mediation requires the mediator to enter into the substance of the negotiation. Since a conflict may not only impede communications between parties, but be so encompassing that it prevents them from conceiving ways out of the dispute, the parties need a mediator as formulator too. Once face-to-face discussions are underway, the main functions of a mediator traditionally include:

(i) Providing ideas or possible solutions, especially when the parties are deadlocked.

(ii) Initiating proposals which originate from one or other party, but which could not be advanced for fear of revealing weakness or uncertainty.

(iii) De-committing the parties by providing some formula by which they can gracefully abandon previous positions to which public acts and statements have heavily committed them.

(iv) Acting as a substitute source of ideas or proposals.12

The third mode requires the mediator to act as a manipulator. Here the mediator assumes the maximum degree of involvement, becoming a party to the solution. As a manipulator, the mediator uses its power to bring the parties to an agreement, pushing and pulling them away from conflict into resolution.

When the mediator acts as a communicator, tact, wording, mixed in equal doses with accuracy and confidentiality, are the necessary character traits that should particularly exist.

The mediator as a formulator must be capable of thinking of ways to unblock the thinking of the conflicting parties and to work out imaginative ways to skirt those commitments that constrain the parties. Also, it must be persuasive and tenacious, for just as the conflict often prevents the parties from finding imaginative ways out, it may also prevent them seeing the value of the mediator's suggestions at first hearing.

The mediator as a manipulator needs to use “leverage”. Leverage consists of political, economic, or even personal punishments and rewards. The mediator uses them to push the parties towards solution.\(^{13}\)

**The Next Step: Sustaining Peace**

When the parties reach a negotiated agreement, the duty of a third-party does not stop there. Ideally, third-parties should monitor the implications of the agreement and take necessary measures to sustain it so that they ensure its survival and durability.

In the final analysis, a negotiated peace agreement is an imperfect road map to the future. It shows the direction the parties must move if they are to consolidate the peace, but it mostly does not tell them how to get there, except in general terms. New problems can emerge, which should be accommodated within the framework of the settlement. Also, there are frequently major unresolved issues at the time an agreement is reached. These issues remain the subject of subsequent negotiations. Further, the act of signing an agreement does not mean that the parties necessarily wish to fulfill all of their commitments under the agreement. Thus, the risk of sliding back into confrontation is usually high in the early stages of the peace process. Even after a modicum of trust is built up between the parties, it can be undermined by perceived violations or failures of compliance.

Hence, one of the key functions of third-parties is to foster trust between warring factions by monitoring compliance and holding them accountable to their negotiated commitments. As needed, third-parties should play their traditional mediation role for continuing negotiations over intractable issues left out of the agreement as well.

The role of third-parties in sustaining peace processes also goes beyond monitoring negotiated agreements and mediating follow-up negotiations, for the act of signing a peace agreement does not automatically create the result that fighting people immediately lay down their arms and return to civilian life. Most of the time, mutual hostilities among the ordinary remain unchanged in the aftermath of negotiated agreements. These undermine the acceptance, as well as implementa-

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tion, of peace at the societal level. Therefore, reaching peace between formal negotiators is not enough for a durable, larger peace. The publics in conflict, too, should be prepared to that end.

This, indeed, constitutes the most challenging area for third-parties. Making peace among a small number of official negotiators would be relatively easy, but making peace among thousands of people who hold hostile images and attitudes towards each other is a real problem. In transforming the relationships that harm the parties at large, multi-tracked intervention strategies should be utilized, which may include—but not limited to—the followings:

(i) Promoting Interdependence and Common Goals

The possibilities for easing antagonism and achieving harmony would be greatly enhanced when conflicting groups are brought together to work toward some common ends. The creation of supranational bodies that have the responsibility for fulfilling key economic and social needs would gradually bring about a transfer of loyalty from the narrow cultural group to the supranational bodies. Eventually, particularistic antagonisms would be dissolved as the participants become caught up in a web of mutual dependence.

Actually, a scientific support to this idea comes from a series of experiments conducted by Muzaffer Sherif, a social psychologist, in an American school camp. In his experiment, Sherif divided a group of boys into two groups, and conflict between them was then encouraged. He observed that as inter-group hostility increased, so did intra-group solidarity. The mutual hostility was overcome when the two groups were brought together to engage in cooperative acts for common ends that they could not obtain on their own. This led Sherif to conclude that only the pursuit of superordinate goals, the goals that can only be achieved by cooperation of conflicting groups, can overcome stereotyping and reduce hostility.

Of course, in real-life conflicts, it is certainly advisable to avoid over-optimism, for the differences separating the parties would be more complex and deeper than differences created by artificially dividing up school-kids in a summer camp. But nonetheless, having and working on common goals would enhance bonds between the parties in conflict in a number of ways. One would be reducing the salience of group boundaries; that is, people who are working toward common goals are
in some sense members of the same group, and thus are not so likely to be antagonistic towards one another. Another would be by a reinforcement mechanism; as the two parties work together, each of them rewards the other and produces a sense of gratitude and warmth in the other. Pursuing common goals also means that each party sees itself as working on behalf of the other, a view that is likely to foster positive attitudes.\textsuperscript{14}

(ii) Re-designing Education for Peace

Formal education is one way that national culture and historical enmities are transmitted from generation to generation. Yet education is a tool that can also be used to foster intellectual and moral qualities, such as critical thinking, openness, skepticism, objectivity, and respect for cultural differences. Education of that sort is usually called “peace education”.\textsuperscript{15} Peace education would be a powerful weapon in the hands of any peace builder, for the whole process of child raising may have a critical impact on attitudes and beliefs in later life. In addition, if the hostile attitudes and perceptions of one generation are not passed on to the next, then the younger generation might be able to deal with intergroup problems in a more constructive atmosphere.

(iii) Coping With Stereotypes and Building Confidence

Even though educational projects that emphasize peaceful changes can have a significant impact on positive attitude changes, it is likely that gains will be small unless such initiatives are part of broader changes in society, since formal schooling is just one part of child raising and just one way in which values are transmitted across generations. Thus, what is additionally needed is the “disarmament of the minds” of the adult.

In almost all violent international conflicts, the parties develop a distrust of one another in the form of negative images. Due to these images, they see and acknowledge negative aspects of each other that fit or support the stereotype, and ignore other aspects that do not fit.\textsuperscript{16} This trend, in turn, inhibits the search for a peaceful solution, or the ac-

ceptance of a negotiated agreement reached at the formal level. Therefore, re-establishing trust between conflicting publics often emerges as an important pre-requisite of constructive intercommunal dialogue.

In his classical study, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1979), Gordon W. Allport sets out several ways that prejudice can be reduced at the community level. To Allport, some of the main strategies include contact and acquaintance programs (i.e., mutually-arranged festivals, community conferences, etc.), positive action by the mass media, and exhortation by local community leaders or opinion makers, such as politicians, academics, writers, and so on.

Another significant way to overcome relational issues would be “track-two diplomacy”. One of the pioneers of track-two diplomacy, both as a theorist and as a practitioner, Joseph V. Montville, defines the term as “an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict”. The approach is derived from the seminal work of John Burton and Herbert C. Kelman, and is rooted in the social-psychological assumption that contact and mutual communication is necessary to normalize hostile relationships.

The paradigmatic application of track-two diplomacy is represented by problem-solving workshops, arranged and facilitated by, ideally, psychologically-sensitive third-parties. Problem-solving workshops are intensive, private, and non-binding meetings between politically influential (but unofficial) representatives of conflicting parties (i.e., Greek and Turkish Cypriots or Israelis and Palestinians) drawn from the mainstream of their respective communities.

Problem-solving workshops provide a setting in which brainstorming and idea-exchanges can occur. Informal discussions create an opportunity for participants to examine the root causes of, and the under-
lying human needs in, conflict, and to identify obstacles to better relationships. Furthermore, by allowing face-to-face communication, problem-solving workshops may help participants arrest the dehumanization process, overcome psychological barriers, and focus on relation building. As a result, reason, rather than emotion, would become the dynamic factor of their future interaction. Best of all, changes at the level of individuals in the form of new insights and ideas, resulting from the micro-level process of the workshop, can then be fed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities, hence becoming vehicles for change at the macro level.²⁰

It should be noted that the practical applications of track-two diplomacy are numerically limited to reach general conclusions regarding the utility of the approach. However, many examples we have confirm that the approach makes a contribution to the overall peacemaking process. For instance, Herbert Kelman, who conducted a significant number of problem-solving workshops between the Israelis and Palestinians before the historic Oslo Accords in 1992, observed that the workshops allowed the participants to gain insights into the perspective of the other party, to create a new climate of trust, and to develop greater awareness of how the other party may have changed.²¹ To some conflict analysts, the Oslo Accords were, indeed, made possible by the cumulative results of intensive problem-solving workshops carried out over a period of years.²²

Similarly, Edward E. Azar, who also organized several workshop exercises around the Lebanese and Sri Lankan conflicts, claimed that the workshops allowed the parties to discover their common needs and values, to establish informal networks, and to widen their agendas towards a mutually acceptable solution.²³

The utility of track-two diplomacy was also observed by "The Center for Multi-Track Diplomacy", a Washington D.C.-based non-governmental

²¹ See, Herbert C. Kelman, “Interactive Problem Solving”, Volkan et al. (eds.), The Psychodynamics of International Relationships,
organization, in re-humanizing the relationship between the parties in conflict, in analyzing the problem in a freer way, and in generating a wide range of alternatives for resolution.24

**Non-governmental Organizations and Peacemaking**

In transforming hostile relationships and overcoming psychological barriers between the parties, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would be particularly helpful. Since state power is always a limitation on what non-governmental organizations can do, the average person tends to think of them as ineffective. But compared to other third parties, NGOs have many advantages. These organizations are free to act in ways which nation-states and other intermediaries are not. Because of their transnational identities, they are able to hold the world public interests above national interests in ways that neither the nation-states, nor even the UN itself can do. They operate with longer-term time horizons than nation states, have a better historical memory for issues, provide education opportunities for conflict resolution, and serve as information channels.25 Many peacemaking activities that require time, effort, and patience, such as track-two diplomacy, can be best dealt with by NGOs. Besides, whereas nation-states and even most international organizations, as third-parties, are usually motivated by the desire for extending influence, NGOs mostly operate independent of power politics; therefore, they are likely to be trusted by the parties in conflict. In short, it is important to recognize and encourage the participation of NGOs as intermediaries and mediators in situations of international conflict.

**Conclusion: Getting to a “Contingency Approach”**

As the above discussions attest, an international conflict is a dynamic process that escalates and de-escalates over time, passing through distinct phases ranging from violent confrontation to nonviolent hostilities. Successful third-party intervention depends, to a great extent, on the correct recognition of the stages of a given conflict and implementing correct strategies in accord with that. In this respect, when violence breaks out, peacekeeping usually emerges as the most urgent strategy,


since without separating antagonists and reducing psychical violence, it is impossible to handle and resolve the conflict. But once peacekeeping introduces a cooling-off period, peacemaking should enter the process. If extensive use of military force, in the form of peacekeeping, goes on despite de-escalation in violence, this would create new problems and re-escalate the conflict. Similarly, if peacekeeping is attempted, but nothing else later, the result would be continuation of the problem, since without proper peacemaking efforts, peacekeeping by itself cannot reverse the underlying causes of conflict.

As a result, in successfully coping with international conflicts in the post-Cold War era, a need for a comprehensive peace strategy arises, combining peacekeeping and peacemaking in the overall resolution process. It should be kept in mind that since the problem is many-sided, there cannot be any single, magic formula. The wisest thing to do, therefore, is to attack from many directions in accord with the requirements of situations. But in the final analysis, the successful combination of peacekeeping and peacemaking will determine the expected outcome of international conflict resolution.
Third-Party Intervention in International Conflicts

Bibliography


